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Grappling at the Grassroots: Access to
Justice in India's Lower Tier
Jayanth K. Krishnan, Shirish N. Kavadi, Azima Girach, Dhanaji
Khupkar, Kalindi Kokal, Satyajeet Mazumdar, Nupur, Gayatri Panday,
Aatreyee Sen, Aqseer Sodhi, and Bharati Takale Shukla*
From 2010 to 2012, a team of academic and civil society researchers
conducted extensive ethnographies of litigants, judges, lawyers, and court-
room personnel within multiple districts in three states: Maharashtra,
Gujarat, and Himachal Pradesh. This Article provides an in-depth ac-
count of the everyday struggles these actors face in the pursuit of their
respective objectives. The findings illustrate a complex matrix of vari-
ables-including infrastructure, staffing, judicial training and legal
awareness, costs and continuances, gender and caste discrimination, power
imbalances, intimidation and corruption, miscellaneous delays, and chal-
lenges with specialized forums-impact access to justice in the lower tier.
The results of this study offer competing yet complementary narratives. On
one hand, there is immense despair, frustration, and anger among the
various sets of respondents about the current state of the lower tier. At the
same time, however, there is great hope and optimism among individuals
who work in the judicial sphere, as well as litigants desperately seeking
to gain relief from long-endured grievances, toward what the lower tier
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Raday, Nick Robinson, Jane Schukoske, Gagan Sethi, and Sehjo Singh gave key encouragement and
feedback for which we are grateful. We are grateful to Marc Galanter for guiding our conceptualization
of the "lower tier." Important research assistance came from Christina Abossedgh, Anuradha Gharti,
Johanna Lohkhande, Ram Krishna Mistry, Ashu Parial, Jitender Rana, and Niyati Trivedi. Enormous
thanks to the Ford Foundation, which provided the critical funding for this research. Different parts of
this Article also greatly benefited from comments received during presentations made at Cornell Law
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and litigants) from whom we learned so much. Out of respect for these individuals, we have protected
their identities and provided them with the anonymity that they requested. The Harvard Human Rights
journal reviewed and verified a sample of the authors' field notes, which were de-identified by the
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can offer. Indeed, if the lower tier is empowered with greater resources and
certain perverse aspects of the legal system can he reformed, it has vast
potential to promote social change that advances the socioeconomic status
of India's most disadvantaged groups.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, Marc Galanter's view of the courts as inherently passive
institutions that primarily benefit those without enough resources to be
"repeat players" captured the imagination of legal scholars.' In the United
States, disadvantaged groups that achieved legal victories in the latter half
of the twentieth century were only able to do so once they had developed
adequate funding, coordinated strategies, and effective legal advocacy, as
well as legislative progress, which meant that they increasingly found a
litigation ally in the federal government. 2 Indeed, Gerald Rosenberg has
observed that the presence of sympathetic judges could not bring about
substantive change for these groups in the absence of executive or legislative
intervention.' Without institutional and resource support, it was difficult
for weaker interests to stave off wealthier opposing parties in court.4 Moreo-
ver, several commentators have observed that legal victories do not necessa-
rily translate into actual improvements in the lives of disadvantaged
groups.
This Article seeks to understand the systemic factors and constraints that
affect the extent to which litigants in India are able to rely on courts to
enforce their rights. Decades of scholarly investigation on the legal system
in India and the manner in which people access justice has tended to em-
phasize the upper tier of the judiciary, namely the State High Courts and
1. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974) (rejecting the belief that American courts had provided material
benefits for claimants seeking economic and social justice). Galanter has noted that his classic study was
inspired by his work in India. See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Peel-Off Lawyers: Legal Professionals in India's
Corporate Law Firm Sector, 9 Socio-LEGAL REV. 1, 3-12 (2013); Telephone interview by research team
with Marc Galanter (Oct. 16, 2012).
2. See IAN Ross BRODIE, FRIENDS OF THE COURT: THE PRIVILEGING OF INTEREST GROUP LITI-
GANTS IN CANADA 7, 141-44 (2002); Galanter, supra note 1. But see MARK TUSHNET, NAACP's LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 1925-1950 (1987); STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELA-
TIONs LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY (1995); Stephen L. Wasby, How Planned is "Planned
Litigation", 9 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 83 (1984).
3. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE Hou.ow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
4. See, e.g., BRODIE, supra note 2, at 1-16; CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS,
ACrIvISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 71-110 (1998).
5. See Epp, supra note 4; Jayanch K. Krishnan, Academic SAILERS: The Ford Foundation and the Efforts
to Shape Legal Education in Africa, 1957-1977, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 261 (2012); see generally HERBERT
M. KRITZER & SUSAN S. SILBEY, IN LITIGATION: DO THE "HAVES" STIu. COME OUT AHEAD? (2003).
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the Indian Supreme Court.6 The focus has been on the lawyers who practice
in these forums, the constitutional jurisprudence produced by the forums,
and the judges who render the decisions.7 A knowledge vacuum surrounds
the vast majority of parties (litigants, lawyers, and judges) who operate in
the lower tier-the district courts; sub-district courts; specialized alterna-
tive bodies; and administrative, quasi-judicial tribunals-where tens of
millions of cases are projected to be pending, many for more than a decade.8
This Article seeks to better understand public perceptions toward these fo-
rums and the extent to which they actually serve as instruments of justice.
Part I provides an overview of the broader theoretical and policy
frameworks on access to justice and judicial power and frames the impor-
tance of access to courts in light of unresponsive government officials. It
argues that while lower-tier judges must be more assertive in protecting the
rights of socioeconomically disadvantaged claimants, they cannot do this on
their own. Part II follows with a description of the research method, which
includes interviews and multi-year ethnographies conducted in three re-
gions of India. Part III presents the findings, focusing on types of infra-
structure, the rules and operations of courts and judges, and, perhaps most
importantly, the types of relief provided to litigants and their perceptions
of the lawyers, judges, and court personnel who serve them. The Article
concludes that judges must play more of an active role in protecting the
rights of socioeconomically disadvantaged claimants. This, in turn, requires
6. See generally Epp, supra note 4; S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL AcTivism IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING BOR-
DERS AND ENFORCING LIMITS (2002); RAJEEv DHAVAN, THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: A Socio-
LEGAL CRITIQUE OF ITS JURISTIC TECHNIQUES (1977).
7. See generally UPENDRA BAXI, COURAGE, CRAFT, AND CONTENTION: THE INDIAN SUPREME
COURT IN THE EIGHTIES (1985); Marc Galanter, Fifty Years On, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: Es-
SAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 57, 57-65 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000); Marc
Galanter, New Patterns of Legal Services in India, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN MODERN INDIA 279, 279-95
(Rajeev Dhavan ed., 1989); P.N. Bhagwati,Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 561 (1985); Jamie Cassels, judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempt-
ing the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495 (1989); Oliver Mendelsohn, Life and Struggle in the Stone
Quarries of India: A Case-Study, 29 J. COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 43, 44-51 (1991); G.L. Peiris,
Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Subcontinent: Current Dimensions, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 66 (1991);
S.P. Sathe, judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 29 (2001); S.P. Sache,
judicial Activism (II): Post-Emergency judicial Activism: Liberty and Good Governance, 10 J. INDIAN SCH.
POL. EcON. 603 (1998); Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices in the Courts of India: Transformation of Standing
in Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 57 (1994-1995).
8. NAT'L CT. MGMT. Sys., SUPREME CT. OF INDIA, NATIONAL COURT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS POL-
Icy & ACTION PLAN 15 (2012), available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/ncms27092012.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/5THN-TTWE?type=pdf; see also Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and
Globalizing Legal Profession, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2189, 2221-26 (2007); Anjani Trivedi, When All
Else Fails, Try the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/
14/when-all-else-fails-try-the-supreme-court/?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/535U-AS5F; judge Me
Not, Bus. & ECON. (Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.businessandeconomy.org/23022006/storyd.asp?sid=
1644&pageno= 1, archived at http://perma.ccl8DPM-YUYX. For a recent study on litigation patterns in
India and their state-level variation along socioeconomic development lines, see Theodore Eisenberg et
al., Litigation as a Matter of Well-Being (Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 12-28, 2012), availa-
ble at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article= 1 102&context= clsops.papers,
archived at http://perma.cc/CED4-VEHD.
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broad support from the bar, the upper judiciary, legal educational institu-
tions, civil society organizations, and state and central governmental
leaders.
I. THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE IMPERATIVE
A. Historical Background and Policy Considerations
Previous attempts to strengthen the hand of the lower tier have met with
varied success. A movement to restore an indigenous legal system flourished
briefly in the years just after Indian Independence.9 As part of the
panchayati raj (local self-government) policy of the 1950s, elected gram
panchayats (local self-government councils) and corresponding nyaya
panchayats (judicial councils) were established with optional jurisdiction
over specific categories of petty cases. 10 Although the nyaya panchayats de-
rived sentimental and symbolic support from their appeal to the virtues of
the indigenous system, they encountered severe problems with adequacy of
judicial training, establishing their independence from personal ties to the
parties, enforcing their decrees, and acting expeditiously." They never at-
tracted significant support from the villagers in whose name they were es-
tablished, and their caseloads declined steadily while those of the district
and sub-district courts rose. 12 By the mid-1970s, nyaya panchayats were
moribund and were eventually replaced by gram nyayalayas, tribunals of
compulsory jurisdiction for certain petty civil and criminal cases.13
9. The lead author published a detailed summary of this topic with Marc Galanter. Therefore, part
of this section, with permission of the original publisher, excerpts that work here, with some edits. See
Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Bread for the Poor: Access to justice and the Rights of the Needy, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 783, 791-97 (2004) (citing Marc Galanter, The Aborted Restoration of 'Indigenous' Law in
India, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN MODERN INDIA, supra note 7, at 53, 56-57).
10. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 791-92 (citing Marc Galanter & Upendra Baxi,
Panchayat justice: An Indian Experiment in Legal Access, in 3 ACCESS TO JUSTICE, EMERGING ISSUES AND
PERSPECTIVES 343, 343-86 (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1978); R. KUSHAWAHA, WORK-
ING OF NYAYA PANCHAYATS IN INDIA 67-88 (L.M. Singhvi ed., 1977)).
11. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 792 (citing Catherine S. Meschievitz & Marc Galanter,
In Search of Nyaya Panchayats: The Politics of a Moribund Institution, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL
JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES 47, 47-77 (Richard Abel ed., 1982)).
12. In Uttar Pradesh, civil filings in the nyaya panchayats decreased four-fold from 82,321 in 1960
to 22,912 in 1970 (just over four cases per nyaya panchayat), while civil filings in the district and sub-
district courts rose from 74,958 to 86,749. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 792-93 (citing
Galanter & Baxi, supra note 10, at 369 tbl.l; KUSHAWAHA, supra note 10, at 99; Meschievitz & Ga-
lanter, supra note 11, at 55).
13. For further discussion on the promise and demise of the nyaya panchayats, see Galanter &
Krishnan, supra note 9, at 793-94 (citing Meschievitz & Galanter, supra note 11, at 68-70; Catherine S.
Meschievitz, PanchayatJustice: State-Sponsored Informal Courts in 19th and 20th Century India 19 (Disputes
Processing Research Prog., Madison Inst. for Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 8, 1987) (providing a
general account of reformers' fondness for panchayats); VR. KRISHNA IYER, EXPERT COMM. ON LEGAL
AID, REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID: PROCESSUAL JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE (1973)
(critiquing Indian legal arrangements while speaking glowingly of nyaya panchayats as part of a larger
scheme of legal aid and access to the courts); P.N. BHAGWATI, INDIA COMM. ON JURIDICARE, REPORT
ON NATIONAL JURIDICARE: EQUAL JUSTICE-SOCIAL JUSTICE 33-34 (1976) (endorsing a system of "law
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India underwent Emergency Rule for nearly two years beginning in
1975, and it was only after the country's return to democracy in 1977 that
there was hope that public institutions could be fashioned to protect the
rights of the powerless.' 4 A Directive Principle enacted in 1976 had decreed
"equal justice and free legal aid," but it remained an unfulfilled promise
during the Emergency Rule." However, after the Emergency Rule ended,
the Supreme Court proceeded to embark on a series of unprecedented and
far-reaching initiatives, including the relaxation of standing requirements,
the appointment of investigative commissions and lawyers as representa-
tives of client groups, and the creation of an "epistolary jurisdiction" in
which judges took the initiative to respond to grievances brought to their
attention by third parties, letters, or news reports.' 6 At the same time, pub-
lic interest litigation and legal aid organizations used the courts to protect
excluded and powerless groups, such as prisoners, migrant laborers, and the
environmentally susceptible.7 Public interest litigation has promoted im-
portant social changes, raised public awareness of many issues, energized
and justice at the panchayat level with a conciliatory methodology"); Upendra Baxi, From Takrar to
Karar: The Lok Adalat at Rangpur, 10 J. CONST. & PARLIAMENTARY STUD. 52 (1976) (describing the
Gujarat lok adalat as independent of official law, both institutionally and normatively, although it bore
no evident connection to traditional tribal institutions)). For background on the gram nyayalayas, see
LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH REPORT ON GRAM NYAYALAYA (1986),
paras. 5.12-5.13, available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1161600/ (describing the intended differ-
ences between nyaya panchayats and gram nyayalayas); The Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, No. 4, Acts of
Parliament, 2009, available at http://www.lawmin.nic.in/doj/justice/gramnyayalayas.pdf; see also Menaka
Guruswamy & Aditya Singh, Accessing Injustice: The Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008, 43 Ecow. & POL.
WICLY. 16, 17 (2010); Gram Nyayalaya Act 2008 to Come Into Effect from October 2, 2009, INDLAW.COM,
http://www.indlaw.com/guest/DisplayNews.aspx?36C64BC7-9E86-4DBC-BA23-38AF9BA5Al39
(last visited Jan. 19, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/DH4R-T2ZL.
14. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 794-95 (citing Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously,
in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL POWER 107, 107-32 (Rajeev Dhavan et al. eds., 1985); Smithu Kothari,
Social Movements and the Redefinition of Democracy, in INDIA BRIEFING 131, 141-51 (Philip Oldenburg ed.,
1993) (noting enthusiasm among civil rights and public interest organizations that democracy could be
ensured by the rule of law following the Emergency)).
15. INDIA CONST. art. 39A., amended by The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976,
§ 8 ("The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal
opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any
other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of
economic or other disabilities.").
16. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 795 (citing Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The
Operations and Limitations on the World's Most Active judiciary, 19 POL. STUD. J. 140, 142, 147 (1990)
(discussing the evolution of social action litigation since the end of the Emergency in 1977); Bhagwati,
supra note 7 (describing how the Supreme Court has used public interest litigation to alleviate the
plight of those who are disadvantaged); Rajeev Dhavan, Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India, 36
J. INDIAN L. INsT. 302 (1994) (noting the difficulty the needy and disadvantaged in India have using
the law, and in turn, how public interest litigation has sought to improve this situation)).
17. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 795-96 (citing, e.g., SAKUNTALA NARASIMHAN, EMPOW-
ERING WOMEN: AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY FROM RURAL INDIA (1999) (describing the activities of
Action for Welfare and Awakening in Rural Environment ("AWARE")); SATHE, supra note 6; G. Oliver
Koppell, The Indian Lawyer as Social Innovator: Legal Aid in India, 3 L. & Soc'Y REv. 299 (1969) (noting
how the implementation of legal aid before the Emergency was desultory); Peiris, supra note 7; D.L.
Sheth & Harsh Sethi, The NGO Sector in India: Historical Context and Current Discourse, 2 VOLUNTAs 49
(1991)).
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citizen action, ratcheted up governmental accountability, and enhanced the
legitimacy of the judiciary.18 However, commentators have criticized top-
down approaches to public interest litigation that were largely limited by
public interest advocates' lack of sufficient resources to thoroughly investi-
gate disputed questions of fact, achieve concrete remedies, monitor per-
formance, or maintain organizational staying power based on a cadre of
generalist volunteers.19
For these reasons, since the mid-1980s there have been efforts to find
other ways to increase access to justice at the individual grassroots levels. A
range of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) bodies have emerged over the
past three decades to deliver resolutions (samadhans) in a more timely man-
ner. 20 However, they may be less effective or of lower quality than district
and sub-district courts.2 1
B. The Unresponsiveness of Politicians and Bureaucratic Officials
Socioeconomically disadvantaged claimants who lack proportional demo-
graphic representation in public office have extremely limited institutional
options for redressing their grievances concerning basic needs like water,
food, health care, sanitation, education, and safety. 2 2 While the panchayats
and jati panchayats (their unofficial, traditional, caste-based counterparts)-
which have transformed in composition and character over centuries-are
supposed to be the most accessible representative body, socioeconomically
disadvantaged groups report that their concerns are routinely ignored. 23
Members of the state legislative assemblies ("MLAs") and national parlia-
ment ("MPs") are also seen as non-responsive, 2 4 as well as caste-driven and
caste-discriminating. 25 "If there are disputes [with the government]," re-
18. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 797 (citing SATHE, supra note 6, at 249-311 (docu-
menting how the environment, rights of women and minorities, rights of the ill and poor, and other
rights all received important protections as a result of public interest lawsuits filed by rights-conscious
activists)).
19. The Supreme Court's public interest docket did not significantly increase between 1960 and
1990. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 797 (citing Epp, supra note 4).
20. See discussion infra Part II.D.
21. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 792-98, 811-28; see also Jayanth K. Krishnan, Schol-
arly Discourse, Public Perceptions, and the Cementing of Norms: The Case of the Indian Supreme Court and a Plea
for Research, 29 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESs 255, 255-90 (2007).
22. See generally Rohini Pande, Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disad-
vantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India, 93 Am. ECON. REV. 1132 (2003).
23. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Oct. 31, 2011); see JACOB
PANADIAN, CASTE, NATIONALISM AND ETHNicITY: AN INTERPRETATION OF TAMIL CULTURAL HISTORY
AND SOCIAL ORDER 105-07 (1987).
24. Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 12, 2012); Interview by
research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 11, 2012); Interview by research team with
litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 6, 2012); Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal
Pradesh, India (Oct. 14, 2011).
25. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 22, 2012); see
PANADIAN, supra note 23; ROBERT HAYDEN, DISPUTES AND ARGUMENTS AMONGST NOMADS 83-109
(1999); PAUL BRASS, THE POLITICS OF INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 228-67 (1994); PRADEEP K.
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marked a Himachali litigant, "there is no way to solve them . .. [because)
they will never get resolved or compromised at the village level. That is
why these matters come to the court."2 6 Litigants complained that elected
officials only came to the aid of those who vote for them or belong to their
political party.27
Elected officials or bureaucrats are seen as especially useless in private
disputes such as labor disputes between employees and employers. 28 Al-
though various government departments are dedicated to hearing labor dis-
putes, and workers are repeatedly proclaimed by state and national officials
to be a major constituency whose concerns are vital, elected representatives
and their staff are often not accessible to provide assistance.29 A labor ac-
tivist noted that "MLAs and MPs are seen at the time of election only. In
five years, they make their own pockets full and leave problems for the next
government."30 A litigant whose home was damaged after a local river
flooded recounted:
When our home got flooded, the media covered it and politicians
took notice of that. The mayor came to my house and so did the
local [city council official}. They came soon after the floods and
they even assured to help us. . . . [But) [w)hen we contacted
them later, no one responded. Now I feel that they came only for
the sake of publicity.3 1
According to litigants, corruption permeates every aspect of grievances
against the government and private disputes to the point where these insti-
tutions were seen as virtually impotent.3 2 A trade union activist explained:
Political leaders somehow find a method of [only] intervening in
labor disputes which are hyped by the media. If they realize they
aren't becoming popular, then they use their petty power to ex-
tort money-usually from the employer and sometimes from the
CHHIBBER, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT ASSOCIATIONS: TRANSFORMATION OF PARTY SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL
CLEAVAGES IN INDIA 135-158 (1999); CHRISTOPHE JAFFRELOT, RELIGION, CASTE, AND POLrTICS IN
INDIA 54-73 (2011); PRATAP BHANU MEHTA, THE BURDEN OF DEMOCRACY 57-84 (2003); ANUPAMA
RAo, THE CASTE QUESTION: DALITS AND THE POLITICS OF MODERN INDIA 39-162 (2009).
26. Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 14, 2011).
27. E.g., id.; Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 31, 2011)
("When we go to the MLA and discuss our problems with him, his first reaction is ... [to ask whether]
our votes have gone to him."); Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India
(Oct. 18, 2011) ("I am from [the] Congress Party and [the] MLA is from [the) BJP party. Because of
this, why would he listen to a poor person like me?").
28. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (June 25, 2012);
Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 14, 2011); Interview by
research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 14, 2011).
29. Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (June 25, 2012); Inter-
view by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 14, 2011).
30. Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (June 25, 2012).
31. Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (May 26, 2011).
32. E.g., interviews cited supra note 29.
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employees as well. In the latter instance, we are left to fight two
battles-one with the employer and another with the
politicians."
A disillusioned energy activist described that under the Electricity Act of
2003, citizens are supposed to be able to present electricity-related griev-
ances to a tribunal that monitors the distribution of electricity,34 but this
commission has ultimately done very little:
We have been trying to work with the commission, but it's far
too difficult to even organize a meeting that will bring all the
MPs and MLAs together at the same time. Then to speak about
their functioning as a dispute resolution forum becomes
irrelevant."
In Himachal Pradesh, however, some litigants spoke positively about in-
teractions they had with local panchayat leaders. 6 One litigant described
how an elected official directly contributed to solving a problem related to
his labor group's legal case:
There was one MLA who put our wage problem into the [state}
parliament, and from that day they increased [the statutory
wage) by 16 rupees from the 36 rupee rate at that time.. . . The
local delegates are good, they perform their duties very well, and
[they try to) preserve people's rights at the local level."
Wealthier, more connected respondents generally echoed this satisfaction
with elected officials. 8 A litigant in the district court said that she had
been able to file her case in court "only because of the support and coopera-
tion of the sarpanch [elected panchayat leader] in my village."39 Another
litigant stated that the locally elected official helped her in gathering and
procuring the documents related to her land for the dispute she was in-
volved in.40 These anecdotes, however, were more like the exception than
the rule.
33. Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 14, 2011).
34. The Electricity Act, 2003, No. 57, Acts of Parliament, §§ 6, 9-11, 2003, available at http://
www.powermin.nic.in/actsnotification/electricity--act2003/pdf/The%20Electricity%2OAct-2003.pdf,
archived at http://www.perma.cc/OfqsRny4P9d; see also App. TRIBUNAL ELECTRICITY, http://aptel.gov.in/
(last visited Mar. 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8L6X-XT9N.
35. Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 14, 2011).
36. Interview by research team with litigants, in Himachal Pradesh, India (June 22, 2012); Inter-
view by research team with litigants, in Himachal Pradesh, India (June 15, 2012); Interview by research
team with litigants, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Mar. 14, 2012); Interview by research team with
litigants, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Mar. 13, 2012) ("The elected representatives of my village are
very cooperative. They do help us to resolve our problems and guide us in court matters too.").
37. Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (June 22, 2012).
38. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 13, 2012).
39. Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 14, 2012).
40. Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 15, 2012).
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Civil servants and the police are also viewed as slow to react and ham-
pered by red tape.4 1 Underlying this pessimism is a strong belief that many
public officials are corrupt,42 a well-known problem plaguing much of In-
dian society. 43 Moreover, public institutions remain male-dominated,44 and
many women continue to perceive intense, deeply seated, and insurmounta-
ble patriarchal biases.4 5 As a result of all these political disadvantages, vil-
lagers may come to believe that, even in its suboptimal state, the judiciary
is one of their only viable institutional options for redress.4 6
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Researchers and Data Collection
Field research was conducted by the authors of this Article and nearly
two dozen additional research partners who speak various Indian languages
and dialects. Field researchers were employees of three human rights non-
governmental organizations ("NGO"), Centre for Social Justice, Jagori
Grameen, and the National Centre for Advocacy Studies. Data collection
took place from 2010 to 2012 using two approaches: semi-structured inter-
views and ethnographic observations (including shadowing and interview-
ing) of respondent groups. These observations were made over the course of
three years inside and outside the courts, in chambers, in offices, at homes,
and in village community centers.
41. E.g., interviews cited supra note 24.
42. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 13, 2012); Interview
by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 12, 2012).
43. See Jayanth K. Krishnan & C. Raj Kumar, Delay in Process, Denial ofustice: The Jurisprudence and
Empirics of Speedy Trials in Comparative Perspective, 42 GEO. J. INT'L L. 747, 751, 767, 775-77 (2011); see
generally BRASS, supra note 25; ATUIL Konu, DEMOCRACY AND DISCONTENT: INDIA's GROWING CRISIS
OF GOVERNABILITY (1990); ATUL KOHLI, THE STATE AND POVERTY IN INDIA: THE POLITICS OF RE-
FORM (1987); MEHTA, supra note 25; Krishnan, supra note 21; C. Raj Kumar, Corruption and Human
Rights: Promoting Transparency in Governance and the Fundamental Right to Corruption-Free Services in India,
17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 31 (2003); Corruption by Country: India, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.
transparency.org/country#IND (last visited Jan. 13, 2014); Pratap Bhanu Mehra, A Decade of Hope,
OUTLOOK INDIA (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?263732, archived at http://
perma.cc/OBqMUNsnipL/; TRANSPARENCY INT L INDIA, http://www.transparencyindia.org (last visited
Jan. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/OKhAruyere3/.
44. See generally SEEMA SINGH, PANCHAYATI RAJ AND WOMEN EMPOWERMENT 8-12, 104-35
(2003); Lori Beaman et al., Female Leadership Raises Aspirations and Educational Attainment for Girls: A
Policy Experiment in India, 335 Sci. 582 (2012); Rikhil Bhavnani, Do Electoral Quotas Work After They Are
Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India, 103 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 23 (2009); Raghabendra
Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in
India, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1409 (2004); Pradeep Chhibber, Why Are Some Women Politically Active? The
Household, Public Space, and Political Participation in India, 43 INT'L J. COMP. Soc. 21 (2002); Maitreesh
Gharak & Maitreya Ghatak, Recent Reforms in the Panchayat System in West Bengal: Toward Greater Par-
ticipatory Governance?, 37 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 45 (2002); Pande, supra note 22.
45. See generally Beaman et al., supra note 44; Pande, supra note 22.
46. Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 18, 2011).
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B. Research Locations
Field research was undertaken in Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Himachal
Pradesh. Subsequent research is essential for determining the applicability
of these findings to other regions. Notwithstanding this caveat, the three
states serve as nice sites for comparisons because of key similarities and
differences among them. Each state has a large rural population in need of
greater access to socioeconomic opportunities. Each also has lower tiers in-
habited by district and sub-district courts, specialized courts, and quasi-
judicial administrative bodies. In addition, each state has upper judiciaries
that promote strategies to reduce the tremendous backlog of cases in the
lower tier.
Nevertheless, there are important variations in the demographics and de-
velopment of these regions. The metropolitan areas of Maharashtra and Gu-
jarat are technologically, financially, and physically more developed than
Himachal Pradesh. Although the population of Himachal Pradesh (where
Hindi is the official language) is just under 7 million people,4 7 Gujarat
(where Gujarati is the official language) has just over 60 million people,4 8
and Maharashtra (where Marathi is the official language) is home to over
112 million people.4 9 Population differences contribute to differences in the
number of courts, law colleges, litigants, lawyers, judges, and backlogged
cases in each state. 0 There is also political variation. Gujarat is led by offi-
cials from the nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party," whereas the Indian Con-
gress Party leads Himachal Pradesh.5 2 A coalition consisting of the Indian
Congress Party and the Nationalist Congress Party leads Maharashtra.13
47. See generally Himachal Pradesh Population Census Data 2011, CENSUS 2011, http://www.census
2011 .co.in/census/state/himachal +pradesh.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
Q7PW-6A6V.
48. See generally Gujurat Population Census Data 2011, CENSUS 2011, http://www.census2011.co.in/
census/state/gujarat.htmi (last visited Feb. 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8LYD-WJUK.
49. See generally Maharashtra Population Census Data 2011, CENSUS 2011, http://www.census20 11.
co.in/census/state/maharashtra.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/F5JV-
VJDX.
50. See State-wise Number of Pendency Civil and Criminal Cases in District and Subordinate Courts of
India, INDIASTAT.COM, http://www.indiastat.com/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (on file with
lead author); State-wise Sanctioned/Working Strength and Vacancies in District and Subordinate Courts in India,
INDIASTAT.COM, http://www.indiastat.com/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (on file with lead
author); Locations Searched: Gujarat, INDIA COLL. SEARCH, http://www.indiacollegesearch.com/law/col-
leges-gujarat (last visited Nov. 23, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/7AGN-6QSY; Locations Searched:
Maharashtra, INDIA CouL. SEARCH, http://www.indiacollegesearch.com/law/colleges-maharashtra (last
visited Nov. 23, 2013), archived at http://perma.ccl3NVC-GV98; Law Colleges in Himachal Pradesh,
HIMACHAL EDUc. (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.himachaleducation.net/law/, archived at http://perma.cc/
VRW3-TGLT.
51. See generally BJP GUJARAT (2012), http://www.bjpgujarat.org/english/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/OmrZAh494ks.
52. See Chief Minister, HIMACHAL PRADESH, http://himachal.nic.in/CMTours.htm (last updated Jan.
8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/HQA4-ZEW6.
53. See Chief Minister, Gov'T MAHARASHTRA (Oct. 19, 2013), https://www.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/
Profile/profileCM.aspx (on file with lead author).
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There is further variation in terms of caste, religion, and tribal populations
among the three states.5 4
C. Respondents
Respondent judges were identified through the public listings provided
by each court of focus. Respondent lawyers were identified through bar
directories or other public listings of practicing lawyers, reference to public
case files, in-person solicitation of those whose offices were located at the
courts, and recommendations from judges, litigants, and court personnel.
Litigants were similarly identified through public case files, referrals from
lawyers who had permission from their clients to share client contact infor-
mation, and through in-person solicitation in courts. Lastly, court personnel
were approached through in-person contact in courts.
D. Forums Studied
Figure 1 depicts the complex web of institutions available to those seek-
ing to pursue their claims."5 There is substantial overlap in the judges,
lawyers, staff, and litigants who occupy these forums, as well as their juris-
diction. While researchers only conducted field research at some of these
forums, they learned about several others through interviews with individu-
als who had experience with them.
The Supreme Court, state high courts, and district courts have both orig-
inal and appellate jurisdiction. The sub-district courts are courts of first
instance and general jurisdiction for petty civil and petty criminal matters.
The gram nyayalayas are pro se village courts that have mandatory jurisdic-
tion for certain petty civil and criminal matters. Administrative quasi-judi-
cial bodies are staffed by civil servant officers, with possible internal
appellate boards. Specialized courts are statutorily created to offer more ex-
peditious relief than the district and sub-district courts. Specialized courts
and administrative courts of first instance and the Central Administrative
Tribunal ("CAT") can appeal to either the high court or the Supreme Court
in rare cases involving fundamental rights. 6 Lok adalats, which are ADR
forums that are either permanently established or convened to resolve hun-
dreds or thousands of pending general or specialized civil cases within a
54. See 2011 Census Data, GOVT INDIA: MINISTRY HOME AFF., http://censusindia.gov.in/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/OCLUSS1YH8R.
55. Dotted arrows indicate a limited appellate pathway for issues involving fundamental rights. See
INDIA CONST. arts. 32, 226. For more information about many of the forums included in the figure, see
Indian Courts, CT. WEBSITES, http://indiancourts.nic.in/sitesmain.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/A4PF-
K3MY.
56. For more information about administrative tribunals, see generally SHARMA BRIJ KISHORE,
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 236 (6th ed. 2011); see also Abhishek Kumar Jha,
"Administrative Tribunals of India": A Study in the Light of Decided Cases (Nat'l Univ. of Study & Research
in Law, Ranchi, India), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1989780 (last
visited Mar. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KW9F-S7TH.
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FIGURE 1
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short time frame, can play a critical role in providing speedy access to jus-
tice; their resolutions are final and cannot be appealed.5 7
Additional state-sponsored ADR forums have designated officials that
can give authoritative advice at the village level, appealable to district
courts in some instances. For example, the Mobile Legal Services ("MLS")
initiative of the Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority ("MSLSA") is
comprised of a coalition of judicial officers (retired or serving), lawyers,
social activists, NGO workers, law students, and law professors who travel
to remote areas to "create awareness on new laws through written and vis-
ual materials in the [community's] local language."18 Additionally, where
possible, the MLS team assists with adjudication and brings together com-
57. Remedies awarded by lk ada/au come with a trade-off: while disputes may bt resolved more
quickly in these forums, monetary awards are usually much smaller than they would be in ordinary
courts. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 808-09. For a thorough analysis of the early k
adaat , see generally id. at 797-833. For further details on the efficiency ofmodern kadalats, see, e.g.,
Stidhar Mothe, Alternative Dispute Resolution Reduces Burden on Courts, METRO INDIA, htp://meroindia.
comDetais.aspxid= 12866 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014), archived at htsp://perma.cciN6DU-MAP9;
Raju Verneker, Permanent Lok Ada/al for Mumbai, AFtERNOON DESPATCH & COURIER (Nov. 25,
2013), http://www.afternoondc.in/citynews/permanentuokadalatg.ormumbai/article96830, archived
at http://perma.cc/K2QF-UHLT; Mega Lok Aaaca to Settle 60,000 Cases, DECCAN HERALD (Nov. 21,
2013), http://www.dedcanherald.comlcontent37a292mega-okadalatsettle6 html archived at
http:/aperma.cc62EB-EK W; Lok Aalat, GUJARAT LEGAL SERV. AUTHORITY, http://gujarathighcourt.
nic.in/gsisalokadalat.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2014), archived at h ttp://perma.cc/H29-H93L.
58. See generally Scheme for Mobile Legal Service-Cam Lok Ada/at in Maharashtra: justice at the Door-
steps, MAHARASHTRA ST. LEGAL SERv. AUTHORITY, http://legalservices.maharashtra.gov.in/Links/latest/
mobile-scheme.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) [hereinafter MSLSA, Scheme for Mobile Legal Services); see
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munity members to watch and engage in the process, with a view toward
achieving a non-adversarial, harmonious process that people at the grass-
roots feel is fair; they also visit inmates "to ensure that there is no violation
of Human Rights and to address the problems of inmates for access to jus-
tice."19 Similarly, the tantamukta gaon samities ("TGS")-headed by the lo-
cal chief of police and composed of village residents-provide ADR at the
village level for petty civil and criminal matters. 60 Criminal or civil proce-
dure codes do not govern these specialized forums; rather, the state encour-
ages them to be creative and entrepreneurial in how they resolve disputes, a
flexibility seen as essential for increasing access to justice.6' TGSs are evalu-
ated for efficiency by the state government, which offers financial rewards
for the best-performing villages.62
In Maharashtra, researchers conducted a total of 274 interviews in two of
the thirty-five districts,' including one district court and two taluka courts
per district, as well as evening courts that seek to expeditiously process
specialized civil matters (typically divorce, property, and water disputes).6 4
In total, interviewees included 24 court personnel (including judicial
clerks, bailiffs, and mediators), 46 judges, 97 lawyers, and 107 litigants.
Researchers also conducted ethnographic observations of the district and
taluka courts, family courts that hear divorce cases, quasi-judicial adminis-
trative tribunals,65 labor courts, revenue courts, and lok adalats organized by
the MSLSA.66 Through their interviews, researchers also learned about other
ADR forums established by legislation or statutorily created bodies,6 7 as
well as the gram nyayalayas.68
also Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, No. 39 of 1987, GEN. S. R. & 0. 762(E), § 13 (1987),
available at http://Iawmin.nic.in/la/subord/nalsa.htm, archived at http://www.perma.cc/Oxp2qKCDSvh/.
59. MSLSA, Scheme for Mobile Legal Services, supra note 58, at 2.
60. The types of cases being dealt with here tend to be minor property matters, small business
disputes, revenue cases, and land-use disputes against the government. Dispute-Free Village, MAHARASH-
TRA ST. PoIucE DEP T, http://www.mahapolice.gov.in/mahapolice/jsp/temp/disputefree.jsp (last visited
Jan. 19, 2014), archived at www.perma.ccl0oKZzZMsA9N.
61. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 830-31.
62. See id. at 804-11; Dispute-Free Village, supra note 60.
63. See generally List of Districts in Maharashtra, CENSUs 2011, http://www.census2011.co.in/census/
state/districtlist/maharashtra.htmi (last visited Jan. 12, 2014), archived at http://www.perma.cc/0DfdD7
x4jMK/.
64. Interview by research team with lawyers, in Maharashtra, India (Oct. 10, 2011); Interview by
research team with lawyers, in Maharashtra, India (Nov. 23, 2011).
65. These forums include the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Maharashtra Administrative Tribu-
nal, Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Consumer Forum, Debt Recovery Tribunal, School Tribunal, Univer-
sity Tribunal, and Charity Commissioner of Maharashtra.
66. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 809-28.
67. Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (June 28, 2011).
68. Few gram nyayalayas have been set up in Maharashtra. Idea ofRural Courts Not a Hit With States,
ZEE NEWs (Jan. 4, 2011), http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/idea-of-rural-courts-not-a-hit-with-
states_678468.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8CE8-RSFR.
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In Gujarat, researchers conducted 743 interviews and made ethnographic
observations in eleven of thirty-three districts,'69 covering district and taluka
courts, 70 specialized courts (including labor courts, consumer courts, and
family courts),7' and an administrative revenue tribunal. 72 These interviews
included 23 judges, 26 court personnel, 180 lawyers, and 514 litigants.
Each district court includes a court of first resort for civil cases involving
higher monetary values and a sessions court for more serious criminal
cases.73 Each district is further divided into talukas, which vary in number
based on the size of the district.74 Although the state government aspires to
have one taluka court per taluka to hear minor civil and petty criminal
matters, to date that has not occurred.75 Thus, some talukas share one taluka
court, which can mean long journeys for litigants and lawyers.7 6 Researchers
also studied some less formal ADR forums that include NGOs and other
Gujarat Legal Services Authority initiatives.77
In Himachal Pradesh, researchers studied one district (out of twelve78 )
and its district court.7 9 Within this district, researchers studied five sub-
districts-alternatively known as sub-divisions or outlying districts (but
not taluka, or tehsil courts, as they are called in Hindi).8 Each has a court
that hears petty criminal or civil cases.8 ' Additionally, researchers studied
multiple tehsil courts that fall under the jurisdiction of administrative reve-
nue officers and hear matters relating to land, employment, pensions, and
social security. Researchers undertook ethnographic observations at three of
these.8 2 Researchers also conducted interviews at two specialized courts, a
labor court and a consumer court. In total, interviewees included ten
69. For more information about these districts, see Seven New Districts as Gujarat's I-Day Gift, DNA
INDIA (Aug. 14, 2013, 11:45 IST), http://www.dnaindia.com/ahmedabad/1874372/report-seven-new-
districts-as-gujarat-s-i-day-gift, archived at www.perma.cc/0gAhE23eJoq.
70. E.g., Interview by research team with district court judge, in Gujarat, India (Jan. 21, 2011).
71. E.g., Interviews by research team with labor court judges, in Gujarat, India (Oct. 19-20,
2011).
72. E.g., Interview by research team with revenue judge, in Gujarat, India (Apr. 25, 2013).
73. Gujarat District Courts, GUJARAT JUDICIARY, http://gujcourts.guj.nic.in/ (last visited Jan. 12,
2014), archived at htrp://www.perma.cc/OrtQ7yP6hbJ.
74. See id.
75. Each Taluka in Gujarat Will Have a Court: Modi, MBC TV (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.mbctv.
co.in/viewnews.php?newsid=89, archived at http://www.perma.cc/0H5ELLMMdHz/.
76. Id.; e.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Feb. 25, 2012).
77. See sources cited infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
78. List of Districts of Himachal Pradesh, CENSus 2011, http://www.census20 11.co.in/census/state/
districtlist/himachal+pradesh.html (last visited on Jan. 12, 2014), archived at http://www.perma.cc/
OtymZPSwG9K/.
79. See District Courts of Himachal Pradesh, HIGH CT. HIMACHAL PRADESH, http://hphighcourt.nic.
in/districtcourts/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2014), archived at http://perma.ccfUW8-E8SQ.
80. E.g., Interview by research team with district and sub-district judges, in Himachal Pradesh,
India (Apr. 28, 2013).
81. E.g., id.
82. Adding to the complexity, the district also has separate sub-tehsils (although there are no sub-
tehsil courts) and several hundred panchayats (local village governmental units) spread throughout the
blocks.
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judges, eighty-four lawyers, fifty litigants, and fifteen court personnel.
Overall, respondents cited land disputes as the most common type of case
(e.g., ownership disputes,83 landlord-tenant disputes,8 4 or the government
seeking to regulate private property"').
III. RESEARCH FINDINGS
Researchers found that the lower tier is characterized by poor court infra-
structure, heavily backlogged dockets, excessive continuances, an insuffi-
cient quantity of judges, and inadequate legal training.Y6
A. Infrastructure
Infrastructure within the district and sub-district courts is poor. There is
a lack of standardization in digital files, and physical files are frequently
haphazardly catalogued in cramped storage spaces.87 Furthermore, electrical
power is irregular, causing lights and fans to shut down for extended peri-
ods of time.88 Although judges, some lawyers, and courtroom staff may
have access to safe water, the same is not true for most litigants who travel
great distances to the courts.8 9 Most courts and the surrounding areas have
inadequate access to food, and transportation to and from the court site is
onerous and not always available.9o Latrines go unclean, and there are insuf-
ficient usable toilets for women.9 1 Judges and lawyers both complain of lack
of office space, computers, and access to libraries. 92 Internet connections are
weak or nonexistent, and legal research tools (ranging from web databases
to the most basic case reporters and legal periodicals) are largely unavaila-
ble.93 While some judges in these regions were satisfied with courtroom
83. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Feb. 25, 2012).
84. E.g., Interview by research team with a tenant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 18, 2011).
85. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Feb. 15, 2012).
86. See generally ROBERT S. MOOG, WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SUPREME? ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS
IN THE CIVIL COURTS IN INDIA 1-16 (1997); Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9; Krishnan & Kumar,
supra note 43; Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyering for a Cause and Experiences from Abroad, 94 CAuI. L. REV.
575 (2006); Interview by research team with district and sub-district judges, in Himachal Pradesh,
India (Apr. 28, 2013).
87. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Apr. 28, 2013);
Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (July 30, 2012).
88. E.g., interviews cited supra note 87.
89. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (July 30, 2012);
Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Feb. 25, 2012); Interview by
research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 31, 2011).
90. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 16, 2012); Interview
by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 14, 2011).
91. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (July 30, 2012).
92. E.g., Interview by research team with prosecutor, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Apr. 10, 2012);
Interview by research team with lawyer, in Maharashtra, India (Oct. 13, 2011); Interview by research
team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (Apr. 29, 2011).
93. E.g., Interview by research team with prosecutor, in Himachal Pradesh, India (June 28, 2012);
Interview by research team with prosecutor, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Apr. 10, 2012).
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infrastructure improvements resulting from the Shetty Commission in the
1990s, noting that they had been provided laptop computers and better
internet connections over the years,9 4 some still lacked sufficient staff, in-
ternet, computers, and libraries.91
For quasi-judicial administrative forums and alternative specialized bod-
ies, the quality of infrastructure varies depending on location and the level
of government support. For example, some specialized body proceedings are
held in the district or sub-district courts themselves-sometimes on the
weekends when there is less crowding-whereas others take place in a sepa-
rate facility.96
B. Staffing
Court staffing is inadequate at all levels. The lack of responsive, honest,
and competent courtroom staff to handle simple matters like scheduling
frequently leads to even greater confusion, inefficiencies, and delays.97
Courts may not provide adequate notice of a court date,98 and may allot
insufficient time for litigants to present their matter.99 A Himachali liti-
gant challenging a local company's eviction efforts described traveling an
extended distance from his village to the court several times because of
incorrect information given to him by court staff. 00 On at least three occa-
sions, he found that multiple parties had been scheduled to appear at the
same time.101 Court personnel were indifferent to his plight and the ten-
94. Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Feb. 9, 2012) ("When we
joined the service, we used to live in rented accommodation. . . . If you look at the residences provided
{to us now], it has four bedrooms (and it is a] double-storied structure. There is no problem."); Inter-
view by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Jan. 28, 2012) ("The entire infrastruc-
ture, buildings, internet, computers, etc. are according to our needs and sufficient."); Interview by
research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Jan. 23, 2012) ("1 am fully satisfied with the
facilities which have been given to us."). In the late 1990s, the Sherty Commission increased the salaries
and room, living, and board stipends across the country for lower-tier judges. See generally All India
Judges Ass'n v. Union of India (2002) 4 S.C.C. 247, Decision on Interlocutory Application 279 of 2010
in Writ Petition 1022 of 1989, available at http://barandbench.com/userfiles/files/File/infrastructure
in.subordinate_judiciary.pdf, archivedat hrtp://www.perma.ccl04JGiJ5RYxB; see also FIRST NAT'LJUDI.
CIAL PAY COMM'N, SHETTY COMMISSION REPORT § 15.87, available at http://biharjudicialserviceasso
ciation.in/Docs/SHETTY_COMMISSIONREPORT(_FULlTEXT_).pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/4JFQ-P3WC (citing All India Judges Ass'n v. Union of India, (1992) 1 S.C.C. 119).
95. Interview by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Feb. 4, 2012); Interview
by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 15, 2011).
96. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 799, 810, 816-17, 821; MOOG, supra note 86, at
135-38.
97. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Feb. 25, 2012).
98. Interview by research team with lawyer, in Maharashtra, India (Apr. 11, 2012) ("[Case] files are
never in the court [on time] according to the cause list . . . . But the reply [from the court clerk) is: 'We
will put it after lunchtime as we already have so much work to do.' . . . Maybe he is really busy but it
happens many times. It is his duty . .. not mine as an advocate. The parties then suffer and they have to
sit in a court for whole day.").
99. E.g., id
100. Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Feb. 25, 2012).
101. Id.
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year delay in resolving his case. 10 2 The litigant had no alternative to the
courts because neither panchayat officials nor the police had been willing to
hear his complaint.10
Judges in district, sub-district, and specialized courts complain of ex-
tremely congested dockets exacerbated by the high number of judicial va-
cancies that go unaddressed. 0 4 Judges consistently stated that delays in the
specialized bodies and administrative forums hampered the delivery of jus-
tice.10 As one specialized court judge remarked, "If a judicial officer is
absent on a particular day, then the file of that day gets delayed for at least
two to three months."o 6
Judges expressed frustration about frequent jurisdiction transfers, noting
that the system of bi- or triennial transfers should be reformed, if not elimi-
nated altogether, because it contributes to a lack of stability in both the
courts and personal lives of judges.o'0 Few judges have the opportunity to
hear a case from start to finish and thus lack complete context to fully
appreciate how a case has developed.' 0 8 A Judicial Magistrate First Class
("JMFC") judge who hears both petty civil and criminal matters at the
taluka level in Maharashtra stated that she could only recall presiding over
two to three cases from beginning to end, and those were all criminal
cases.' 0 9 Frequent transfers prevent judges from establishing roots in com-
munities, which means they lack incentives to remain cognizant of the
broader, longer-term community impacts of any given judicial opinion." 0
Judges also complain that transfers place an enormous strain on a judge's
family, and courts are not equipped to continuously adjust to the demands
and needs of different judges who have different work habits, expectations,
and skill levels."'
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. E.g., Interview by research team with senior judge, in Maharashtra, India (May 16, 2011)
("Delays are caused because of the disparity in proportion of judges to the large flow of cases in the
criminal courts. According to the Uudicial Officer) Manual, there should be a maximum of five hun-
dred cases on the file of each judge. But we are dealing with almost five thousand cases on each of our
files."); Interview by research team with district court judge, in Gujarat, India (Jan. 21, 2011).
105. E.g., Interview by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Jan. 31, 2012);
Interview by research team with judges, in Gujarat, India (July 10, 2011).
106. Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Jan. 31, 2012).
107. E.g., Interview by research team with high court judge, in Gujarat, India (Jan. 21, 2011);
Interview by research team with district and sub-district judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Apr. 28,
2013); see also MOOG, supra note 86, at 66-69 (discussing the problems of judicial recruitment).
108. Interview by research team with high court judge, in Gujarat, India (Jan. 21, 2011).
109. Interviews by research team with judges, in Maharashtra, India (Apr. 21, 2011) ("The only
time I have seen a civil case filed before me also end before me is when it has been withdrawn.").
110. Interview by research team with district and sub-district judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India
(Apr. 28, 2013).
111. Interview by research team with high court judge, in Gujarat, India (an. 21, 2011).
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C. Judicial Training & Legal Awareness
Clients are often completely unfamiliar with the legal process and need
lawyers to spend enormous amounts of time educating them about what can
and cannot be done through litigation.112 Because very little legal aid is
provided by either the bar or the state, many judges see themselves as si-
multaneously filling the role of educator, representative, and adjudicator for
the poor.'1 3 Yet adjudicators in specialized forums lack adequate training in
the relevant specialized areas such as labor, consumer protection, land, and
social security." 4 Far too often, the training they receive is general and
conducted by members of the upper judiciary who also lack specialization
in these areas of the law, with some training judges merely reading the
relevant statutes."' In addition, private lawyers noted that many laws are
outdated and inapplicable to everyday life in India." 6
Many judges in the district and sub-district courts find themselves pre-
siding over a wide range of cases, many of which they have little to no
familiarity with, and therefore may not feel comfortable making final deci-
sions.117 In part, this is caused by how district court judges are appointed,
which can follow two different paths. In one path, a lawyer can be ap-
pointed to the bench after practicing for a certain period of time." 8 In the
three focus states, however, it is more common for judges to come to the
lower-court benches through the second path: taking a series of civil service
exams following their law school graduation.119 According to judges, a ma-
jor drawback of the latter approach is that they often preside over cases
involving seasoned lawyers who tend to know more about the law than the
judges do, making them feel insecure, cautious, and unwilling to take a
112. Interview by research team with lawyers, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 1, 2011).
113. Interview by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Feb. 4, 2012); Interview
by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 15, 2011); Interview by research team
with judges, in Gujarat, India (Jan. 21, 2011).
114. E.g., Interview by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Apr. 28, 2013);
Interview by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Sept. 1, 2011); Interview by
research team with judges, in Gujarat, India (Jan. 21, 2011).
115. Interview by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Sept. 1, 2011).
116. Interview by research team with lawyers, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 27, 2011) ("The
laws are made by the bureaucrats who do not know the reality of the people who actually need these
laws.").
117. Interviews by research team with judges, in Maharashtra, India (Apr. 21, 2011) ("Every judge
in the lower court has all kinds of cases before him--civil, criminal, company matters, family disputes,
etc. Unlike in the High Court, there isn't an assignment of judges to a particular type of dispute.
Therefore it becomes difficult to focus on and understand the various aspects of a particular law. If there
was more planning involved in the assignment of cases . . . maybe we could see more number of cases
from start to end.").
118. See generally LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON METHOD OF
APPOINTMENTS TO SUBORDINATE COURTS/SUBORDINATE JUDICIARY (1986); Arvind Kumar, Short Essay
on the Suhordinate Courts in India, PRESERVE ARTICLES, http://www.preservearticles.com/20111112168
43/short-essay-on-the-subordinate-courts-of-india.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/MH2E-HMFD.
119. See sources cited supra note 118; see also MooG, supra note 86, at 65-70.
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more assertive lead during the case.120 Although younger lawyers frequently
look to judges for advice and guidance on questions of law, without a prac-
tice background, judges may not be able to provide assistance.121 As a result
of this dynamic, judges generally either defer to the veteran lawyer's argu-
ments, defer to the government if it is one of the parties, or strategically
issue adjournments to buy themselves more time, especially if both sides
have a veteran lawyer making persuasive arguments or both sides have
young lawyers whose questions they are unable to answer.122
Lawyers and judges expressed concern that members of TGSs in
Maharashtra seemed to have little understanding of their mission or aware-
ness of how the proceedings ought to be conducted.123 A junior lawyer in
Maharashtra even complained of illiteracy among TGS committee mem-
bers.12 4 A veteran lawyer stated that these forums frequently entertain cases
and facilitate compromises that they are not "even empowered to hear,
[and} as a result the compromise has not a legal basis."l25
The quality of legal education and lawyering at the grassroots level must
be improved. Books are outdated, English (the formal language of legal
precedents from the higher courts) is not emphasized, university infrastruc-
ture is abysmal, and teacher absenteeism is high.12 6 The curriculum is based
on learning statutes and regulations in a rote manner.127 Especially in the
more rural law colleges, there is no opportunity to educate students
through clinics or to engage them in critical analysis of the daily problems
they are likely to encounter in practice.12 8 In most law schools, the values of
helping the poor, promoting professional ethics and community responsi-
bility, and following the Gandhian maxim of "never let[ting) my profes-
sion stand in the way of my public service" are sadly absent.129
Lack of adequate training discourages judges from being proactive or
aggressive in their decision making, instead preferring to rule on matters in
as narrow and technical a fashion as possible.' 3 0 Judges themselves acknowl-
edge the problem that they are often not equipped with the full array of
necessary skills to adjudicate the cases that come before them; a chasm ex-
120. Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Apr. 28, 2013).
121. E.g., id.
122. Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Sept. 1, 2011); see also
MOOG, supra note 86, at 25-26, 78-87.
123. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (June 28, 2011); Interview
by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (Apr. 27, 2011).
124. Interview by research team with lawyers, in Maharashtra, India (June 7, 2012).
125. Id.
126. See generally Jayanrh K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford
Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HisT., 447, 494-98 (2004);
C. Raj Kumar, Legal Education, Globalization and Institutional Excellence: Challenges for the Rule of Law and
Access to justice in India, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 221 (2013).
127. See sources cited supra note 126.
128. See id.
129. M.K. Gandhi, How to Spiritualize the Profession, YOUNG INDIA, Dec. 22, 1927, at 428.
130. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Sept. 1, 2011).
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ists between what is being taught and the everyday realities on the
ground.'' Notably, judges receive little training on socioeconomic rights
and concede that they often do not know how to decide cases involving
them. 132
Notably, litigants also cited their own illiteracy, which they were self-
conscious about, as a source of delay. 3 3 There is tremendous confusion over
how to fill out legal paperwork, 34 as well as which of many forums to file a
complaint in,'3 ' resulting in litigants often being redirected multiple
times.' 6 A young woman in Maharashtra whose mother accompanied her
for moral support explained, "I don't know anything about law and the
process of court hence I do not have the courage to face the process . . . all
by myself."37 Another Maharashtrian who only spoke Marathi remarked,
"Unfortunately, all the laws are printed in English, so I cannot even access
the bare laws in Marathi so that I can understand a little of what the law-
yers and judges are doing in my case."3" An indigenous litigant whose
matter had been pending for over twenty-five years in a taluka court
recounted:
Most part of the court's time has been spent on (gathering] evi-
dence. The judges ask for several documents. [But] we are illiter-
ate and ignorant-on most occasions we do not know what
documents the judge is asking for. All we learn is that it takes
very long to acquire them.3 9
The lack of literacy and formal schooling causes litigants to feel insecure
and lack confidence in the courts, as it is difficult for them to even under-
stand village-based legal awareness campaigns. 40 Illiteracy disempowers
both litigants and their lawyers, leading to resentment and suspicion stem-
ming from litigants' lack of control and lawyers' frustration at litigants'
inability to engage.14'
131. E.g., Interview by research team with district and sub-district judges, in Himachal Pradesh,
India (Apr. 28, 2013); Interview by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Sept. 1,
2011); see generally MOOG, supra note 86.
132. See sources cited supra note 131.
133. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 22, 2012); Inter-
view by research team with litigants, in Maharashtra, India (Feb. 19, 2012); Interview by research team
with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (une 25, 2011); Interview by research team with litigant, in
Maharashtra, India (une 15, 2011).
134. E.g., Interview by research team with litigants, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 11, 2011).
135. E.g., id.
136. E.g., id.
137. Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (une 15, 2011).
138. Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (une 11, 2012).
139. Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (une 25, 2011).
140. E.g., Interview by research team with litigants, in Maharashtra, India (Feb. 19, 2012); Inter-
view by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (une 15, 2011).
141. E.g., interviews cited supra note 140.
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D. Costs and Continuances
Taluka judges in Maharashtra explicitly rejected the notion that the
courts did not offer a place for litigants to seek legal assistance, explaining
that because courts are packed with lawyers looking for work, costs are low
for would-be litigants.142 However, indigent litigants cited costs as a major
barrier to accessing the courts.143 Frequently, additional fees emerge as liti-
gation progresses, such as court fees, photocopying fees, file-retrieval fees,
scheduling or calendar fees for court appearances, and "refresher" fees con-
tingent on the length of the case, as well as unpredictable extralegal fees.1 44
A repeated, bitter complaint from litigants was that lawyers routinely
charge fees that seem quite arbitrary.' 4  When litigants were unable to re-
mit a demanded fee, work on their behalf stopped, and even where pay-
ments were properly made, cases continued for excessively long periods of
time. 46 The lack of a systematic, transparent fee collection structure further
enhances negative perceptions of lawyers.147
Many litigants cannot afford to forego even a day's wages to appear in
court. 4 8 A Himachali litigant explained, "We earn 3,000 rupees [USD 60)
in a month, and our [initial] court date costs between 500 [USD 101 to
1,000 rupees [USD 20]," adding that they do not have the connections to
get reduced fees.149 Another litigant summarized the experiences of many:
During court days, one has to be sitting at court for the whole
day. We wait for our number to be called and no one knows
when that will be. We cannot go to eat or go to the washroom as
our case may be called at any moment. We can't even [go to]
drink water just in case we will be called. There are no facilities
for the poor people in the court and it is only . . . the rich people
[who can afford to deal with this system]. 5 0
Continuances play a large role in increasing costs and further delaying ac-
cess to justice. The presence of this interlocutory appeal system dates back
to British times, whereby the Crown had the opportunity to petition any
142. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (Apr. 25, 2011) ("The
judiciary is an open place. I think it is most accessible. The Indian judiciary hears petitions of a person
even if he has filed it on behalf of his neighbor."); Interview by research team with judge, in Maharash-
tra, India (Apr. 29, 2011); see also MooG, supra note 86, at 78-84.
143. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 22, 2012); Inter-
view by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 15, 2011).
144. Interviews cited supra note 143.
145. E.g., Interview by research team with revenue judge, in Gujarat, India (Apr. 25, 2013); Inter-
view by research team with litigants, in Maharashtra, India (June 15, 2011).
146. E.g., Interview by research team with litigants, in Maharashtra, India (Feb. 19, 2012); Inter-
view by research team with litigants, in Maharashtra, India (June 15, 2011).
147. E.g., interviews cited supra note 146.
148. Interview by research team with litigants, in Himachal Pradesh, India (July 3, 2012).
149. Id.
150. Interview by research team with litigants, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Apr. 4, 2012).
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ruling that it felt was wrongly decided all the way to the Privy Council in
London.' This process served as a safeguard against adverse decisions made
by nationals who staffed the lower courts in colonial India.15 2 This system
carried over to independent India, where it has become a perverse incentive
for "delay lawyering."153
Some judges have responded to exorbitant delays by restricting the num-
ber of continuances they permit per case. 1 4 Other judges, however, noted
that they repeatedly grant continuances because of intense pressure from
parties and lawyers not to dismiss the matters outright."' This pressure
mattered to the judges because, as they remarked, they too are part of the
social fabric of the community, even though their jobs are already relatively
isolated, lonely, and lacking in camaraderie.1 5 6 Government lawyers, how-
ever, complained that this leads to delays beyond their control, particularly
in cases where the government is the defendant. 57 While politicians,
judges, clients, and even the bar are well aware of delay tactics in the lower
tier,5 8 legislators-who face a powerful bar-have been unable to amend
the procedural codes enough to curtail and sanction those lawyers who
abuse the system.
E. Gender and Caste Discrimination
Female litigants and lawyers face similar biases as they navigate the dif-
ferent lower-tier forums.1 5 9 Both groups endure the indignities of having to
151. See Jayanth K. Krishnan and Viplav Sharma, Exceptional or Not? An Examination of India's
Special Courts in the National Security Context, in GUANTANAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL COURTS
AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE AND POLICY PERSPECTIVE 283, 284-85, 287 (0. Gross
& F. Ni Aolain eds., 2013); see also Marc Galanter, When Legal Worlds Collide: Reflections on Bhopal, the
Good Lawyer, and the American Law School, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 292, 296-97 (1986); Baar, supra note 16,
at 144.
152. See Baar, supra note 16, at 144; Galanter, supra note 151.
153. See, e.g., MooG, supra note 86, at 73-76; Jayanth K. Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms, 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 57, 73 (2010).
154. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (Sept. 15, 2011) (blaming
the lawyers for perpetuating this problem by constantly asking for continuances and saying he "merely
dismiss[es) the case if the advocate seeks more than three adjournments"); Interview by research team
with senior judge, in Maharashtra, India (May 16, 2011) ("1 try [to give] as few adjournments [continu-
ances) as possible. When a matter is at the stage of final hearing, I give a maximum of three adjourn-
ments, each for not more than a week."); Interview by research team with district court judge, in
Gujarat, India (Jan. 21, 2011).
155. E.g., interviews cited supra note 154.
156. E.g., id.
157. E.g., id.; Interview by research team with lawyers, in Himachal Pradesh, India (June 28,
2012); Interview by research team with prosecutors, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Apr. 29, 2012); Inter-
view by research team with prosecutors, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Apr. 10, 2012).
158. See, e.g., MOOG, supra note 86, at 73-76; Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 811-12;
Krishnan, supra note 153.
159. Interview by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 15, 2012); Inter-
view by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 14, 2012); Interview by research team
with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 13, 2012); Interview by research team with lawyers and
judges, in Maharashtra, India (Nov. 23, 2011); Interview by research team with lawyers and judges, in
Himachal Pradesh, India (Nov. 9, 2011); Interview by research team with lawyers and judges, in
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work in environments where basic human infrastructural needs are unmet:
lack of available and clean washrooms, absence of security to prevent and
protect them from routine harassment and intimidation, unavailability of
safe transportation to bring them to and from the courts, lack of adequate
seating in (male-dominated) waiting areas, and gender-based verbal
prejudice are just a handful of reprehensible conditions that require
remedies. 160
Female litigants regularly encounter poor treatment from their own
counsel, opposing counsel, and courtroom staff,'6' which can cause them to
feel marginalized, unassisted, and isolated.16 2 The few female advocates that
work within the bar are clearly aware of their minority status.1 63 They regu-
larly receive short shrift from courtroom staff, making it even more difficult
to schedule court dates for their clients.'6 Women are rarely in positions of
power within bar associations, 6 1 can be taunted and bullied by their male
colleagues, and are often literally shoved aside in chaotic courts.166 The fe-
male lawyers observed in this study had to proactively assert themselves to
survive in an extremely male-dominated environment. In addition, the
small number of female judges only further makes female lawyers feel alone
within what is clearly a difficult workplace culture.'67
Several lawyers reported indirect caste discrimination against themselves
or their clients in the specialized courts. 68 This might include opposing
lawyers who fail to act in good faith during negotiations or opposing clients
who make subtly derogatory comments during out-of-court dealings.'69
Courtroom staff workers may also be rude, condescending, and purposely
inefficient in the scheduling and overall handling of claims made by low-
caste litigants or their lawyers.170
Himachal Pradesh, India (Nov. 2, 2011); Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal
Pradesh, India (Oct. 31, 2011); Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India
(Oct. 18, 2011); Interview by research team with lawyers and judges, in Maharashtra, India (Oct. 10,
2011).
160. Interviews cited supra note 159.
161. Id.
162. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 14, 2012).
163. E.g., Interview by research team with lawyers and judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Nov. 9,
2011); Interview by research team with lawyers and judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Nov. 2, 2011).
164. E.g., interviews cited supra note 163.
165. E.g., id.
166. E.g., id.
167. E.g., id.
168. Interview by research team with lawyer, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 12, 2011); Inter-
view by research team with labor court lawyers, in Gujarat, India (Dec. 1, 2011); Interview by research
team with lawyer, in Maharashtra, India (Oct. 14, 2011).
169. Interview by research team with lawyers, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Nov. 11, 2011).
170. Id.; Interview by research team with lawyers, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Nov. 4, 2011).
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F. Power Imbalances
Specialized court judges in Maharashtra expressed hesitancy regarding
potentially unfettered judicial power due to great power imbalances be-
tween parties in these forums.'17 In the absence of formal due process rules,
disadvantaged litigants are especially vulnerable to biases and power polit-
ics. 17 2 The government is a party in many cases concerning water and elec-
tricity, and judges may be inclined to rule in its favor in the absence of
formal rules or subject-matter training.' 7 3 The absence of procedural proto-
cols contributed to a lack of seriousness by the parties.1 7 4 Because ad hoc
sessions take place without predictability or regularity, and adjudicators
appear weak in the absence of formal rules, opposing parties may resist
requests to appear, thwarting litigants' efforts to make use of institutions
such as TGSs.17 1 Moreover, selection of judges in these forums can be demo-
graphically skewed and based more on the political preferences of the con-
vener than on merit or experience.' 7 6 Some worry about perverse incentives
resulting from the system of government rewards for forums like TGSs: one
taluka judge who tried to work with a set of ADR forums reported that
they enhanced their statistics by reporting settlements for cases lacking offi-
cial records to receive financial rewards from the state government or attract
media attention.'7 7
Judges and lawyers viewed the administrative, quasi-judicial forums
studied in Maharashtra as being characterized by political influence, lax
practices, and chaotic proceedings with slanted outcomes.s7 8 Interviewees
viewed overburdened revenue officers as particularly ineffective and subject
171. E.g., Interviews by research team with judges, in Maharashtra, India (Oct. 10-11, 2011);
Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (June 28, 2011) ("This informality in the
system may itself be the reason for their failure. Where there are no rules of procedures, there are
chances of power politics and undue biases.").
172. E.g., Interviews by research team with judges, in Maharashtra, India (June 28, 2011).
173. Interviews by research team with judges, in Maharashtra, India (June 28, 2011) (noting that
judges "are more likely to pass orders in favor of the government bodies," mainly because these forums
"don't have procedures, they don't have [adequate opposing] lawyers, and the presiding officers [judges]
have no knowledge of the law").
174. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 14, 2012).
175. Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 14, 2012) ("The Com-
mittee made all efforts to convince the opposite party to settle the matter at the village level itself; but
the opposite party was unwilling and avoided attending the meetings of the Committee.").
176. See HAYDEN, supra note 25. Sometimes the relevant statute will define how judges are se-
lected; alternatively, judges may be sitting or retired district or taluka court judges, civil servants, or
new judicial training graduates. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 811-12; Interview by research
team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 14, 2012).
177. Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (Apr. 21, 2011) (noting that
this judge had even sought to engage "these committees as part of . . . a legal aid program, but ...
received no cooperation from them").
178. E.g., Interview by research team with lawyers, judges, and litigants, in Maharashtra, India
(Nov. 23, 2011); Interview by research team with lawyers, judges, and litigants, in Maharashtra, India
(Nov. 22, 2011); Interview by research team with lawyers, judges, and litigants, in Maharashtra, India
(Oct. 14, 2011); Interview by research team with lawyers, judges, and litigants, in Maharashtra, India
(Sept. 14, 2011); Interview by research team with taluka judge, in Maharashtra, India (May 25, 2011);
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to pro-government bias.1'7 Similarly, neither lawyers nor judges were san-
guine about the gram nyayalayas or TGSs in Maharashtra.s 0 These forums,
which are filled with pro se litigants, are seen as having significant power
imbalances between the parties.'8 1 Additionally, the court environment is
heavily male-dominated, with security officers doing little to stop verbal
and sometimes physical harassment of females.182
G. Intimidation and Corruption
Although judges staunchly defended the integrity of the judicial system,
some stated-as did government lawyers-that corrupt practices
abound." Intimidation is widespread; witnesses are frequently threatened
or bribed by defendants, and judges report that some unscrupulous mem-
bers of the bar perpetuate these practices by taking additional fees to coerce
a settlement.18 4 Prosecutors-who are often confronted with state witnesses
who can turn hostile out of fear of retribution-worried about inadequate
security, particularly during criminal trials in the district courts. 8 1 As part
of the intimidation process, associates of criminal defendants often lurk
around the courthouses or sit in the gallery during the trial itself.18 6 This
type of threatening behavior faces little deterrence from court security, and
prosecutors' demands for enhanced home security are routinely ignored. 87
Similarly, defense lawyers representing accused criminals felt as though
they are not safe from harassment by the police patrolling the court
grounds.' 88 These lawyers saw court and jail police engaging in intimidat-
ing behavior toward defendants, ranging from verbal threats to physical
Interview by research team with lawyer, in Maharashtra, India (Mar. 15, 2011); Interview by research
team with lawyer, in Maharashtra, India (Feb. 23, 2011).
179. E.g., Interview by research team with lawyers and judges, in Maharashtra, India (May 2, 2011)
("[Rievenue officers . . . at the taluka level . . . have a variety of duties, from supervising schemes
[programs] to maintaining records. There is a lot of burden of them. How can such a man have the time
and energy to deliver justice? Moreover, they are controlled by political leaders, so the probability of
exercising bias is larger."); Interview by research team with taluka judge, in Maharashtra, India (May
25, 2011).
180. E.g., Interview by research team with lawyers and judges, in Maharashtra, India (May 2,
2011); Interview by research team with lawyers, in Maharashtra, India (June 7, 2012).
181. Interviews cited supra note 180.
182. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (July 30, 2012).
183. E.g., Interview by research team with lawyer, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 7, 2011);
Interviews by research team with labor court judges, in Gujarat, India (Oct. 19-20, 2011); Interview by
research team with lawyer, in Gujarat, India (Oct. 17, 2011).
184. Interview by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Feb. 4, 2012); Interview
by research team with judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 15, 2011); Interview by research team
with judges, in Gujarat, India (Jan. 21, 2011).
185. E.g., Interview by research team with prosecutor, in Himachal Pradesh, India (June 28, 2012).
186. Id.
187. Id. ("The [defendant] party may harm us anywhere .... Our private residence is far away
from the office and to reach our home we have to walk. Who knows who will attack us?").
188. E.g., Interview by research team with defense lawyer, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 6,
2011).
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assaults.189 Some defense lawyers interpreted this as putting them on notice
that they too are being watched and are at risk if they challenge the inter-
ests of government authorities.190 Similarly, some judges viewed both gram
nyayalayas and lok adalats in Maharashtra as extremely unsafe environments
for presiding adjudicators, who are under significant pressure to rule ac-
cording to popular appeal.19 '
While corruption was not necessarily seen as a problem by litigants vis-t-
vis lower-tier adjudicators, many litigants-including approximately 80%
of litigants interviewed in Gujarat-said that they had been asked to pay a
bribe by lower-level staff at some point during an administrative proceed-
ing. 192 Litigants in Maharashtra reported difficulties acquiring required
documentation, scheduling hearings, or getting status updates without pay-
ing an extralegal fee.' 93 A litigant in Himachal Pradesh seeking to schedule
an administrative hearing regarding dam construction affecting his residen-
tial property explained his experience:
We asked the reader [if} there were two possible dates within a
month . . . . The reader said that it was possible if they were
provided with some service. . . . [W]hen we offered some refresh-
ments to him, such as eggs or liquor, then we got the two dates
within the month.19 4
Moreover, both judges and prosecutors expressed concern about lawyers
who engage in subterfuge, deliberately delaying proceedings or intention-
ally providing inadequate information to litigants."5 Judges who traveled
to villages to assist in legal awareness campaigns routinely found lawyers
attempting to subvert their mission. 196 Judges noted that appearance-based
fee structures serve as a perverse incentive to keep cases in the system-a
practice that judges repeatedly stated they had a legal and ethical obliga-
tion to challenge.197
189. E.g., id.
190. Id.; Interview by research team with lawyers, in Maharashtra, India (Nov. 10, 2011).
191. Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (May 2, 2011) ("At the gram
nyayalaya, the judge sits without any protection before society at large. He is bound to feel pressurized
in this scenario and take a decision of popular appeal.").
192. All interviews conducted with litigants in Gujarat, India; e.g., Interview by research team
with litigants, in Maharashtra, India (June 13, 2012); Interview by research team with litigant, in
Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 31, 2011); see also MooG, supra note 86, at 76-92 (noting how clerks,
process servers, and unskilled workers influence how rapidly or slowly cases progress based on unofficial
fees or tips).
193. See sources cited supra note 192.
194. Interview by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (May 7, 2012); see also
MooG, supra note 86, at 76-92 (discussing the power of court staff in the litigation process).
195. Interview by research team with prosecutors, in Himachal Pradesh, India (June 28, 2012);
Interview by research team with lawyer, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 7, 2011); Interview by
research team with lawyer, in Gujarat, India (Oct. 17, 2011).
196. Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 15, 2011).
197. E.g., id
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Former Chief Justice S.H. Kapadia is an inspiration whose actions can
and should be replicated within the lower tier. Chief Justice Kapadia, who
served from 2010 to 2012, made it his mission to stamp out corruption
among staff members in the High Courts and Supreme Court.'19 He came
into office knowing full well that the perception of the judiciary was in
tatters. 99 The number of corruption cases stalled in the courts contributed
to this negative image, but another major problem in his view was that
court staff members were engaging in a range of corrupt practices. 20 0 Not
infrequently, later cases would leapfrog earlier ones, certain litigating par-
ties would not receive important notices from staff members in a timely
fashion, or staff would provide misinformation to lawyers and parties. 20 1 To
stem this corruption, Chief Justice Kapadia fervently brought to light these
transgressions. 20 2 In a break from tradition, he made public speeches de-
nouncing staff within his own court as well as within the other High Courts
who participated in this behavior. 2 03 He wrote letters to his High Court
colleagues on the bench urging them to aggressively stamp out corruption
within their institutions and publicly rebuking those who failed to do so. 20 4
He was heavily involved in monitoring staff practices and developed a repu-
tation for stamping out corruption. 205 A well-known observer of Indian le-
gal practice noted:
Kapadia [sought to] fix . . . this [system of corruption) through
sheer force of personality and hard work, poring over the list of
the next day's hearings with a fine tooth comb. 'People in the
registry were in terror of him,' recounted one advocate about how
the chief managed to stem the registry's indiscretions. 2 0 6
H. Overlapping Jurisdictions
There is often overlapping jurisdiction among two or more forums, leav-
ing litigants (and sometimes even their lawyers) confused about where to
proceed with their claims. According to private lawyers in Himachal
198. C]I's Trailblazing Legal Legacy: Kapadia Set to Demit Office After Reinforcing Faith in Judiciary,
MAIL ONLINE INDIA (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2200
839/CJIs-trailblazing-legal-legacy-Kapadia-set-demit-office-reinforcing-faith-judiciary.html, archivedat
http://perma.cc/Onc3pFn3iWn [hereinafter MAIL ONLINE INDIA).
199. See id.
200. Kian Ganz, SH Kapadia, End of an Era: India's Greatest Ever C]I or Missed Opportunity? How
Will You Remember the Legacy?, LEGALLY INDIA (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.legallyindia.com/201209
283149/Interviews/sh-kapadia-end-of-an-era-indias-greatest-ever-cji-or-missed-opportunity-how-will-
you-remember-the-legacy, archived at http://perma.cc/OyJTrKSFnGal.
201. See MAIL ONLINE INDIA, supra note 198; Ganz, supra note 200.
202. See MAIL ONLINE INDIA, supra note 198; Ganz, supra note 200.
203. See MAIL ONLINE INDIA, supra note 198; Ganz, supra note 200.
204. See MAIL ONLINE INDIA, supra note 198.
205. See Ganz, supra note 200.
206. Id.
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Pradesh, the main source of delay is the existence of too many forums for
any given claim, which results in cases being transferred from forum to
forum and judge to judge. 2 0 7 One exasperated lawyer explained:
My client was involved in a case . . . which has been pending
since the year 1974. I am the thirteenth advocate to be pursuing
this case before the district court. . . . The case went to four
courts and from the upper court it was taken back to the lower
court before finally being referred to the [specialized] financial
court. [Then there was] delay . .. [because of) the lack of availa-
bility of the finance commissioner who is engaged in [two differ-
ent cities]. It thus depends on when the finance commissioner
wants to come in. Nowadays he visits monthly, and he visits only
if he is free from his work at [his other city]. But sometimes his
[hearings here are) . . . canceled due to various reasons such as
illness . . . . [and] sometimes parties have to go [to the other city]
with their cases, which also causes delays in the case. 208
Underlying the forum confusion, judges and court personnel are often
unaware of the procedural rules for how to move cases through the sys-
tem. 2 09 There is no uniformity in legal procedures across forums regarding
rules of evidence, lawyer involvement, and the availability of appeals. 210
I. Other Delays
Judges noted that localizing all of the relevant parties for even a single
hearing is an extremely difficult task because many families do not live
together on a daily basis, with males often working in neighboring districts
or states.211 Prosecutors complained that the government departments they
represent stall, fail to turn over evidence, and impede claimants from re-
ceiving efficient verdicts in court. 2 1 2
Litigants attributed delays to: lack of appearance in court by the oppos-
ing party or opposing counsel, multiple adjournments and appeals, failure
of opposing parties (particularly governmental entities) to pay judgment
awards fully, scheduling mistakes, misplaced hearing documents, lack of
transportation, and judge absenteeism.2 13
207. Interview by research team with lawyers, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 11, 2011).
208. Id.
209. E.g., Interview by research team with lawyer, in Gujarat, India (Oct. 17, 2011).
210. See MOoG, supra note 86, at 42-45, 73-84.
211. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Jan. 23, 2012).
212. E.g., Interview by research team with prosecutor, in Himachal Pradesh, India (May 10, 2012).
213. Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 13, 2012); Interview by
research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (Feb. 15, 2012); Interview by research team with
litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 31, 2011); Interview by research team with litigant, in
Maharashtra, India (June 14, 2011); see also MOOG, smpra note 86, at 42-64, 89-92, 147-54 (noting
similar factors in a study of district courts in Uttar Pradesh).
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Private lawyers expressed frustration that they were seen as causing de-
lays, 214 and many believed that litigants are partially responsible for pro-
longing litigation, with one lawyer explaining that "[nlo judicial process
alone is responsible [for the delays). It is the party which lingers on the
case. . . . They make the case lengthy by . . [demanding} unnecessary
applications."215 Efficient representation is also often thwarted by late pay-
ment of legal and court fees, which can cause lawyers to lose interest in the
representation. 2 16 If a court filing fee is missed or an administrative bill
goes unpaid, the client's case is tabled and placed toward the back of the
queue even if the arrears are ultimately satisfied.217 Inadequate trust in the
lawyer-client relationship creates further "delays or a different outcome
than the lawyer could have expected."218
Many of the lawyers who work at the grassroots suffer from apathy, self-
interest, and a lack of critical skill sets. It is noteworthy that these views
reflect honest sentiments from the lawyers themselves. 219 Many lawyers
concede that their daily professional lives are a struggle to eke out an exis-
tence to support themselves and their families. Although lawyers admit to
contributing to delays, even if a few tried to move matters quickly through
the process, the inertia within the bar is too deeply embedded to meaning-
fully alter the collective action problem and status quo.2 20
J. State-Sponsored ADR Forums
ADR forums like TGSs can provide relatively fast and inexpensive reso-
lution of some disputes, frequently disposing of cases involving land dis-
putes, petty criminal charges, and divorce in less than a year. 221 In part, this
is because parties can appear pro se, relying instead on judges who, free
from common delay tactics, are incentivized to expeditiously move cases
forward. 2 22 The absence of lawyers also gives judges more opportunity to
interact directly with litigants.2 23 A judge who served both in district and
specialized courts said the following regarding this benefit of closer claim-
ant-judge interaction:
I feel that parties before such forums are more willing to listen to
the advice of the forum and cooperate, probably because they no-
214. E.g., Interview by research team with lawyer, in Gujarat, India (Oct. 17, 2011); Interview by
research team with lawyers, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 11, 2011).
215. Interview by research team with lawyer, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 7, 2011).
216. Interview by research team with lawyers, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 1, 2011).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. E.g., Interview by research team with lawyers and judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Nov. 9,
2011); Interview by research team with lawyers and judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Nov. 2, 2011).
220. E.g., interviews cited supra note 219.
221. Id.
222. Observations by research team, Maharashtra, India (Apr. 19, 2012).
223. Id.
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tice that even the judge presiding over that forum has heard
them out patiently. . . . [In the district] courts, we have to handle
so many cases that we cannot afford to deliberate for long over
one case. Many times, the litigant only wants to be heard, but we
are unable to do so because of the constraints of procedure, [pres-
ence of lawyers,] and case overload.224
The flexibility of ADR affords judges greater opportunity to work with the
parties in a conciliatory manner to reach settlements that are agreeable to
all involved. 225
K. Specialized Courts
Sometimes specialized court judges can arrive at quicker conclusions
where they have become specialists in the particular area of law that their
forum is designed to oversee. 226 One hundred eighty generalist lawyers in
Gujarat who had experiences or familiarity with specialized courts and
ADR forums in their areas were asked what forums were best at protecting
the rights of their clients. Twenty-three percent stated that the consumer
forum was the best at protecting claimants' rights, followed by the labor
courts at 15% and NGOs at 13%.227 There was a fairly even distribution
among how the lawyers viewed the remaining forums.228
In Maharashtra, the availability of evening courts that handle specialized
civil matters (typically divorce, property, and water disputes) does not ap-
pear to have reduced case pendency in the district and sub-district courts. 22 9
Judges, lawyers, and staff who work in the evening courts often are the
same people who work during the day, and they are overworked, underpaid,
and exhausted by evening. 2 30 Public transportation is unreliable or unavail-
able at night, which especially serves as a barrier for women who face
heightened security risks when traveling late. 231
224. Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (Apr. 19, 2011).
225. See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at 810-28.
226. Observations by research team, Maharashtra, India (Apr. 19, 2012). Although, specialized
forum judges go through routine transfers as well, which hinders the specialization process for some of
them. Id.
227. These statistics are based on all interviews conducted with lawyers in Gujarat, India.
228. Id. These forums included specialized courts (nari ada/ats (women's courts), motor vehicle
accident courts, juvenile courts, family courts, Judicial Magistrate First Class courts, workers' union
courts, ad hoc specialized courts held at the district level as ordered by the upper judiciary), administra-
tive, quasi-judicial bodies (social welfare department courts, district collector courts, taluka collector
courts or mamlardar courts), and ADR forums (lok adalats and other initiatives of the Gujarat Legal
Services Authority, police tribunals, petty arbitration tribunals).
229. Interviews cited supra note 64.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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IV. OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
The Indian Constitution has a progressive set of Directive Principles in-
fluenced in part by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2 32 The
framers of the Indian Constitution set forth the Directive Principles as as-
pirational goals encompassing a progressive range of economic, social, legal,
and political ambitions the state ought to pursue. 233 While the Directive
Principles are technically considered non-justiciable, courts have substan-
tively incorporated them into rulings at different points throughout the
post-independence period. 234 In addition to embodying socioeconomic
rights in the Directive Principles, India has acceded to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"),2 35 which
mandates the progressive realization of socioeconomic rights. 23 6
Although decades of scholarship documents the upper judiciary as central
for engaging in the serious adjudication of these types of matters, 237 the
lower judiciary, specialized alternative forums, and administrative courts at
the grassroots level encounter such issues as well. Relying on the findings
above, this Article revisits a central question of the law-and-society dis-
course in India, namely the extent to which Indian judges can and should
play a greater role in securing the rights of those in need. Although cases in
the lower tier involve discrete parties who are keen to pursue their respec-
tive individual claims, the questions of law and policy that are raised have
broader economic and social ramifications. Because those who are
socioeconomically disadvantaged receive such little support from local
elected representatives and civil servants, judges in the lower tier may be
the primary protectors of claimants who bring forth social and economic
grievances.
232. See RAJESH KUMAR, UNIVERSAL'S GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 59 (2011); M.R.
Biju, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A DEVELOPING SOCIETY 69-70 (2005); Circle of Rights: Economic, Social &
Cultural Rights Activism: A Training Resource, UNIV. OF MINN. HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., http://wwwl.
umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/justiciability.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cclZT3Z-6KS3 {hereinafter Circle ofRights].
233. See generally SATHE, supra note 6; Jayna Kothari, Social Rights and the Indian Constitution, L.
Soc. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. J. (Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/ elj/1gd/2004_2/kothari,
archived at http://perma.cc/8M28-AKB7.
234. See Circle of Rights, supra note 232; see generally GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF
LAW: INDIA S SECULARISM IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT (2003).
235. India acceded to the ICESCR in 1979. Status Report, Int'l Covenant on Civil & Pol. Rights,
U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20/Chapter%20I
V/IV-3.en.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/E6PF-3H3Z.
236. These include the work-related rights to equitable and humane employment conditions and
the right to form labor unions. Additionally, the treaty recognizes the rights to social insurance, a life
with a family, safe living conditions, health care, education, and participation in civil society and cul-
tural life. International Covenant on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights arts. 2.1, 7, 8, 10-15, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
237. See generally Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9; sources cited supra note 6.
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Judges-who are seen as more legitimate than other public officials for
historical, cultural, and religious reasons 238-occupy a space that allows
them to serve as important discursive agents with the power to frame issues,
shape perceptions, and resolve disputes through logic, reason, and notions
of equity. Thus, lower-tier judges in India can and should envision their
role not as narrow technocrats-delivering short, terse opinions that privi-
lege formal procedural rules above all else, as they have traditionally been
trained to do239-but instead as deliberate, careful thinkers whose decisions
can have enormous ramifications beyond the parties involved at bar. Be-
cause judges draw on a host of formal and informal community norms when
addressing the litigants, lawyers, and witnesses during the course of a pro-
ceeding, they already engage in a combination of rule- and norm-setting as
well as rule- and norm-following.24o Far too commonly, though, judges,
despite their best intentions, give mixed messages and act unpredictably
toward parties and lawyers. 2 4 1 Even more commonly, though, they do not
have the resources to engage as discursive agents protecting the interests of
individuals whose interests go unnoticed elsewhere.
At least some judges desire to play a greater role and make more of a
difference in the lives of those most in need. 242 As upper-level Indian judges
have done for decades vis-at-vis state and national political leaders, 243 more
powerful and respected lower-tier judges could serve as an effective check, a
useful set of advisors, and a potential source of inspiration for local leaders
who too often operate by fiat with only self interest as their guiding force.
However, many existing constraints would need to be lifted and legal train-
ing improved for lower-tier judges to be so empowered. 24 4
238. See FAu NARIMAN, INDIA's LEGAL SYSTEM: CAN IT BE SAVED? 123-30 (2006); SATHE, supra
note 6, at 161-94; Velcheru Narayana Rao, Courts and Lawyers in India: Images from Literature and
Folklore, in BOEINGS AND BULLOCK-CARTS: STUDIES IN CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN INDIAN CIVILIZA-
TION 196, 196-214 (Y.K. Malik & D.K. Vajpeyi eds., 1990); Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 9, at
795-98.
239. Interview by research team with district and sub-district judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India
(Apr. 28, 2013).
240. See Daniela Berti, Trials, Witnesses, and Local Stakes in a District Court of Himachal Pradesh, in
CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY, AND BELONGING IN THE HIMALAYAS 290, 292-93, 307-14 (Joanna Pfaff-
Czarnecka & Garard Toffin eds., 2011) (relying on an ethnographic observation of a case in Himachal
Pradesh that showcases how local and state politics can affect courtroom proceedings); see also Daniela
Berti, Courts of Law and Legal Practice, in A COMPANION TO THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF INDIA 355,
355-70 (Isabelle Clark-D6ces ed., 2011) (arguing that the observation of case proceedings in court can
highlight how norms and culture affect the different stakeholders who are participating in the process);
Daniela Berti, Hostile Witnesses, judicial Interactions, and Out-of-Court Narratives in a North Indian District
Court, 44 CONTRIBUTIONS INDIAN Soc. 235 (2010) (noting how adjudicating and prosecuting cases can
take different turns and affect lawyers, judges, and litigants when witnessess change their stories or turn
hostile).
241. See sources cited supra note 240.
242. Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Apr. 28, 2013); Inter-
view by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (July 30, 2012).
243. SATHE, supra note 6, at 1, 18-24.
244. Interviews cited supra note 242.
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Moreover, district court judges feel further restricted by their colleagues
in the high courts who may reverse decisions or stay judgments on appeal;
sub-district judges feel similarly vis-a-vis their district court superiors. 245
Judges feel constrained by the prevailing norm of the steep judicial hierar-
chy that longer judgments that discuss substantive justice, legal philoso-
phy, public policy, or socioeconomic implications should be left to the
upper judiciary.2 4 6 A senior district court judge noted that interpreting and
taking decisions on the law was for the judges in the upper judiciary. 247
Another lower-court judge who had been on the bench for sixteen years
remarked:
Merely working according to the procedures laid down is not
enough to do justice. Judges need to be given freedom-the free-
dom to be more creative as regards interpretation. Technicalities
shouldn't be allowed to come in the way of justice. The hands of
the judges are almost tied under the garb of legal procedure. 248
Yet another senior district court judge discussed a case where a witness
sought a court order for police protection because a defendant was threaten-
ing him. As the judge detailed:
[The witness] was ultimately fighting for his right to life. The
Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class dismissed the peti-
tion stating that his court had no jurisdiction to decide the issue.
[This judge ruled that] issues concerning the right to life can
only be raised before the High Court. The matter came in appeal
before me. I allowed the petition and passed an order granting
the complainant police protection. This order, however, was re-
versed . . . on the ground that the lower judiciary did not have
the jurisdiction to hear such a petition. The applicant was a poor
man who would never be able to afford the expenses of filing an
application before the High Court. What use is right to life be-
ing a justiciable right if it cannot be accessed in any court by any
common person?24 9
Critics of a more empowered lower tier of judges may argue that en-
hanced judicial activism threatens the very essence of a democratic repub-
lic-that the lower tier itself has systemic deficiencies that inhibit
predictable and equitable justice delivery, or that it is inappropriate for
judges to address political disadvantages. Indeed, many lawyers interviewed
245. Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Apr. 28, 2013).
246. Interview by research team with district and sub-district judges, in Himachal Pradesh, India
(Apr. 28, 2013).
247. Interview by research team with judge, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Sept. 14, 2011) ("We are
only a fact-finding court. We cannot interpret law. We do not take decisions on the law.").
248. Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (May 7, 2011).
249. Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (Apr. 5, 2011).
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strongly believed that constraining judges in the lower tier-with the
higher-court judges serving as a check on them-is in the best interests of
litigants. 25 0 With that said, based on qualitative assessments of the legal
educational institutions at the grassroots, the vast majority of lawyers prac-
ticing in the lower tier are not qualified to sit as judges, and indeed em-
powering this group en masse might threaten (rather than aid) the
socioeconomically disadvantaged.
The following account by a lower-court judge, who prided himself on
being activist and socially conscious, illustrates this concern:
I have a case before me where a sixteen-year-old girl was raped by
a neighbor's son. The boy was arrested. In the meanwhile, the
parents of both the boy and the girl arranged the marriage of
these two. When the advocate applied for bail for the boy, the
girl's father requested the bail on the ground that the boy had
now agreed to marry his daughter. Now, in such a situation, I
know that the girl will not proceed with the case. She is bound to
turn hostile if I pursue it. I allowed the bail. The couple is due to
get married in December. I have warned the boy that . . . if he
doesn't keep his promise and marry the girl, the court will take
action. In such cases, the court has to keep the social situation in
mind. People have faith in the court and we must keep up to that
faith. This cannot be done by deciding cases only according to
the law.251
Such a perspective undermines the type of activism conducive to enhancing
justice at the grassroots. Instead of promoting a marital union between the
rapist and the victim, the judge should have educated the girl and her
family about the criminality of this behavior. He ought to have been at the
forefront of protecting the girl's interests and her rights, and should have
had the perpetrator arrested and indicted on criminal charges of sexual as-
sault. The judge's actions of encouraging and endorsing a marriage between
the two, taken in the name of harmonizing a "social situation," only reifies
norms of inequality and perpetuates existing discrimination, sexism, and
sexual violence.
A broad and deep-seated mentality of patriarchy and gender bias that
pervades the courts at the lower levels and much of society has prompted a
globally recognized social movement surrounding a notorious incident of
gang rape in New Delhi. In December 2012, six men raped a twenty-three-
year-old woman on a bus, severely beating her male companion as well. 25 2
250. Interview by research team with lawyers, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Dec. 15, 2011).
251. Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (Sept. 15, 2011).
252. The Indian and worldwide media extensively covered this attack. See, e.g., Gangrape Victim
News, NDTV, http://www.ndtv.com/topic/gangrape-victim (last visited Oct. 27, 2013), archived at
www.perma.cc/0mGZT53UmcE; Archives Search: Delhi Rape, N.Y. TIMES, http://query.nytimes.com/
search/sitesearch/#/%22Delhi%22+%2B+rape; see also Pratiksha Baxi, We Must Resist the Cunning ofju-
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The female victim's injuries were so severe that a Delhi hospital had to
transport her to a better facility in Singapore, where she tragically died
shortly after arrival. 25 3
As these events unfolded, a movement arose on the streets of the capital.
Thousands of people protested gender bias, sexism, and violence against
women throughout the country. 254 The government has promised to enact
measures in an effort to answer these protests. In 2013, the Justice Verma
Committee Report recommended defining rape as a crime of power (rather
than passion), expanding rape to include marital rape, specifically criminal-
izing non-penetrable sexual assault and verbal assault, and other important
proposals. 255 Around the same time, however, members of the ruling politi-
cal classes indefensibly made various incendiary comments, parallel in na-
ture to those of the aforementioned lower-court judge.25 6 A culture of
gender bias, gender discrimination, and gender-based violence thus remains
rife throughout Indian society and seeps into the courts. 25 7 There is an ur-
dicial Reform, KAFILA (Dec. 29, 2012), http://kafila.org/2012/12/29/we-must-resist-the-cunning-of-judi
cial-reform-pratiksha-baxi/, archived at www.perma.cc/OxSyvaWzNxP; Pratiksha Baxi, Rape Cultures in
India, KAFILA (Dec. 23, 2012), http://kafila.org/2012/12/23/rape-cultures-in-india-pratiksha-baxi/,
archived at www.perma.cc/06Zp9HEddnf; Pratiksha Baxi, The Verma Manifesto, INDIAN EXPRESS (Jan.
25, 2013), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-verma-manifesto/1064418/, archived at http://
perma.cclVGH2-Y8W6 [hereinafter Baxi, The Verma Manifesto] (commenting on the Verma Commis-
sion's recommendations on how to deal directly with the crisis of violence against women in India).
253. See sources cited supra note 252.
254. See id.
255. The report is an indictment of India's legal system, its tolerance of such crimes, and the
ineptness of the state in its attempts to allow victims to redress their grievances after suffering such
violence. J.S. VERMA ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS TO CRIMINAL LAW (2013),
available at http://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/01340/Justice-Verma.Comm 1340438a.
pdf, available at http://perma.cc/RX35-L8SD?type=pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE VERMA COMM. REP.); see
also Baxi, The Verma Manifesto, supra note 252 (noting additional recommendations).
256. See supra text accompanying note 251.
257. One of the most infamous and unfortunate set of remarks came from the son of the President
of India. See Sreeja VN, Delhi Gang Rape: Indian President's Son in Trouble After 'Sexist' Comment, INT'L
Bus. TIMEs (Dec. 27 2012), http://www.ibrimes.com/delhi-gang-rape-indian-presidents-son-trouble-af
ter-sexist-comment-972990#, archivedat www.perma.cc/OS368k99YPQ. Yet as the Justice Verma Com-
mittee Report notes, the problem goes deeper than just the comments of ill-informed individuals. See
JUSTICE VERMA COMM. REP., supra note 255, at 1-19. The report points to the embedded culture of
violence and the acceptance of such violence, which the Justice Verma Committee calls upon to be
eradicated from Indian society. Id. In December 2013, the Indian Supreme Court issued a judgment
that highlights how even courts at the highest level of the judiciary can disregard the human, economic,
and social rights of certain groups. See Koushal v. Naz Found., (2013) Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013
(arising out of SLP (c) 15436/2009), available at http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgsl.aspx?
filename=41070. In Koushal, a two-justice panel consisting of Justices G.S. Singhvi and S.J.
Mukhopadhya ruled that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which provides that "whoever volunta-
rily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be pun-
ished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine," id. at para. 32, is constitutional, id. at para. 54. In
an analytically vacant opinion, the Court overturned a lower court judgment that had invalidated Sec-
tion 377. Id. at para. 54; see also Naz Found. v. Gov't of NCT of Delhi, (2009) 160 D.L.T. 277. The
Koushal judgment's impact is geared at specifically and unconstitutionally discriminating against a set
of minority groups-namely lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered communities by targeting them
with imprisonment as well as economic and social punishment. The court's ruling that opponents of
Section 377 should seek redress in Parliament, see Koushal, (2013) Civil Appeal No. 10972, at para. 56,
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gent need for greater sensitivity, understanding, and empathy for the socio-
economic rights of girls and women. To begin, active efforts must be made
to increase the number of women in the judiciary. 258 To be sure, a complete
cultural overhaul must involve education, training, civil society groups, and
resource allocation from government leaders committed to gender justice
and social and legal equality at the grassroots.
Empowering the lower tier to overcome deep-seated biases requires not
only cultural reform but also structural innovation. To this end, the Verma
Committee Report recommended the establishment of more alternative and
specialized forums to address the needs of victims of gender-based
crimes. 25 9 These kinds of relatively expedient forums, such as the mahila
panch (women's council), the nari adalat (women's court), and grassroots
educational, advisory, counseling, and advocacy initiatives, already exist in
some regions. 2 60 An important step toward expansion of such forums should
be the establishment of more "fast-track courts" for cases involving vio-
lence against women. 2 61
Indeed, in other types of cases, such as land cases, judges have been at the
forefront of social change. In several of the jurisdictions studied, many
judges are from farming communities and agricultural castes. Both lawyers
and claimants noted that these judges tend to have a stronger grasp of the
legal and factual issues in these matters. 2 62 For instance, one lawyer re-
marked that because "many of the judges also belong to farmer families ...
[they) can therefore understand the circumstances or contexts of the dis-
putes or cases."2 63 Another lawyer stated that he observed judges approach-
ing land cases with great sympathy for struggling farmers. He said that
judges "do not insist on [the strict formalities ofJ procedure," and instead
are willing to consider the immediate challenges facing individuals
claimants. 264
defies the institutional obligation that the judiciary has in protecting the interests of minority groups.
There is hope that Koushal will soon be reversed by a larger bench of the Supreme Court, or that
Parliament will redact this archaic statute that violates individual liberty and basic human rights.
258. While data on the number of female judges in the lower tier is not readily available, at the
high court level, less than 6% of judges are women, and the Supreme Court has only ever had five
female judges. Sai Manish, Can Our Courts Be Just to Women When They Promote So Few Women?, YAHOO!
NEWS INDIA (Sept. 16, 2013), http://in.news.yahoo.com/can-our-courts-be-just-to-women-when-they-
promote-so-few-women--072257488.html, available at http://perma.cc/XD5B-X4MS?type= image.
259. See JUSTICE VERMA CoMm. REP., supra note 255, at 260-311, 383-424.
260. See INT'L CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INDIA: EXPLORING STRAT-
EGIEs, PROMOTING DIALOGUE 5-WOMEN-INITIATED COMMUNITY LEVEL RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VI-
OLENCE (2002), available at http://www.icrw.org/files/publications/Domestic-Violence-in-India-5-
Women-initiated-Community-Level-Responses-to-Domestic-Violence.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
LZG6-4BJR?cype=pdf.
261. See Set Up More Fast-Track Courts to Try Rape Cases, HINDU (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.the
hindu.com/todays-paper/tp-narional/tp-karnatakalset-up-more-fasttrack-courts-to-try-rape-cases/article
5423921 ece, archived at http://perma.cc/9UZN-R7D8.
262. E.g., Interview by research team with lawyer, in Maharashtra, India (Oct. 13, 2011).
263. Id.
264. Interview by research ream with lawyer, in Maharashtra, India (Oct. 14, 2011).
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There is perhaps no better example of judges being at the forefront of
social change in land cases than with squatters' rights. As one judge
explained:
It is important that we respect the law of our land. The law is,
after all, enacted for the benefit of its citizens. Trespass is wrong,
but . . . [iln most cases, . . . people encroach because of circum-
stances of dire poverty. The situation that poverty places these
people in would compel even the most law-abiding person to
encroach. For instance, in this case, the people had no roof over
their head. There were women in this group-single mothers,
young girls, and widows. Let us say I had allowed the decision of
eviction to be implemented overnight. Such young girls would
be brought on the street. They would have no shelter, no privacy,
and no protection. What if they were assaulted or abused? Who
would take responsibility for that? At some level, the state would
be responsible for her situation, wouldn't it? Therefore, at such
times, I take into consideration the emergency that must have
compelled the persons to take recourse to an illegal act and I give
precedence to the principles of natural justice over all other
procedures. 265
The decision by this judge to allow the squatters to stay on the property
until alternative arrangements could be made 26 6 highlights an example of
how there may be a glimmer of hope for claimants when there is expanded
judicial power at the local level. Still, episodes like these are more ad hoc
than routine and sustained.
CONCLUSION
In general, judges believe they are doing the best they can, given limited
resources. 267 Judges defend the effectiveness of their institutions as prefera-
ble to corrupt panchayat leaders, politicians, and administrative bureau-
crats.2 68 Similarly, litigants believe that the legal system is relatively
legitimate and that judges-with the exception of adjudicators working in
quasi-judicial bodies-are relatively trustworthy and more rights-ori-
ented269 as compared to unresponsive legislative and bureaucratic officials
265. Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (June 28, 2011).
266. Id.
267. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (June 30, 2011) ("Litigants
have a lot of facilities; all the laws and the judicial infrastructure is for them only. There is even the
legal aid center and other service providers all working to provide litigants with assistance.").
268. E.g., Interview by research team with judge, in Maharashtra, India (Apr. 29, 2011).
269. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Maharashtra, India (June 15, 2012); Inter-
view by research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 19, 2011); Interview by research
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like politicians, police, and civil servants. 2 70 Litigants hold hope that judges
can safeguard their rights and interests better than anyone else. 27 1 To begin
with, given the respect that lower-tier judges have within their communi-
ties, judges should be incentivized to take the lead in fighting corruption.
Training and education must be enhanced for current judges as well as
for students studying to become judges. Moreover, judges' salaries could be
increased to attract more motivated, thoughtful, and talented people from
the bar to view the judiciary as a place where they would like to work.
Judge salaries, accommodations, and benefits pale in comparison to what
the top lawyers earn.2 72 While achieving parity may not be practical or
politically possible, there is certainly room for further modest adjust-
ments.27 3 Reducing the frequency of transfers and increasing personal secur-
ity measures could also make the bench more appealing for potential
candidates who have families or working spouses. With improved training,
judges could use dicta to expound on matters that they are passionate about
but rarely have an opportunity to officially express. Dicta can set forth a
judge's aspirations for how the law should function in future situations or,
as is common in the Indian context with the higher courts, how the govern-
ment should conduct itself on significant issues relating to public policy.
More resources and greater financial commitment to the lower tier by the
central government are critical if there is to be a transformation in how
effective and efficient this institution functions. Court infrastructure and
staffing need significant improvements. More judges must be added to the
lower-tier bench to reduce the excessively high workloads of sitting judges.
Court staff must be better equipped to deal with claimants' queries regard-
ing the litigation process and disincentivized from seeking extralegal fees.
The legal system should be streamlined, and clear guidelines on how to
navigate it should be developed for both claimants and lawyers.
team with litigant, in Gujarat, India (Oct. 7, 2011). But see MOOG, supra note 86 (concluding that
litigants perceive the lower courts as failed institutions).
270. Interviews by research team with litigants, in Maharashtra, India (June 7, 2011) ("Elected
representatives do not help people after the elections."; "Elected representatives of this village are not
capable of protecting the right of the common people. They only want to help the economically power-
ful. They do not have an interest in the issues of poor people."; "Although elected representatives are
capable, they do not help people like us after elections are over. They are only interested in making
money and gaining power. After the election, they are seen helping and supporting only the economi-
cally well-off people."; "Elected officials are competent enough to protect socioeconomic rights but
they cannot ensure implementation of their orders."; "{Elected officials) take money from the develop-
ers to pass orders that regularize [the developers'] illegal encroachments. We are not against sitting and
discussing issues with the politicians but we are against them . . . [promising the] addressing [of)
grievances that they have caused themselves.").
271. E.g., Interview by research team with litigant, in Gujarat, India (June 15, 2012); Interview by
research team with litigant, in Himachal Pradesh, India (Oct. 19, 2011).
272. See Priya Sahgal and Kaveree Bamzai, The New Nawabs, YAHOO! NEWS INDIA (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://in.news.yahoo.com/the-new-nawabs.html.
273. Ashutosh Bhardwaj, Delhi Govt Clears Three-Fold Hike in Salaries for Judges, INDIAN EXPRESS
(Feb. 13, 2011), http://www.indianexpress.com/news/delhi-govt-clears-threefold-hike-in-salaries-for-
judges/749342/, archived at http://perma.cclN6Z6-VLSU.
188
2014 / Grappling at the Grassroots 189
The bar should embrace greater transparency in its fee structure to allow
litigants to properly weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing court action,
relying on the trusted guidance from the representing lawyer-just as the
system was intended to work. The number of appeals that lawyers are al-
lowed to make under the procedural codes should be curtailed to halt the
clear patterns of abuse occurring at the expense of needy claimants.
Perhaps most immediately, the gender inequality and gender discrimina-
tion that exists in the lower tier must be eliminated. For a country that was
led out of colonial rule by eminent lawyers who preached this same mes-
sage, the modern-day bar should be vigorous in promoting the rights of the
socioeconomically disadvantaged, including by promoting women's in-
volvement in all facets of the lower tier. Only then can the lower tier pro-
vide access to justice for all Indians.

